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BRANDING THE SMALL WONDER:
DELAWARE'S DOMINANCE AND THE
MARKET FOR CORPORATE LAW
Omari Scott Simmons *
INTRODUCTION
"Here, corporate law is an industry that is important
unto itself, and we know that if we are perceived as un-
fair, it matters."1
- Vice Chancellor Leo E. Strine
In the world of brands, Ritz-Carlton reflects luxury, Volvo re-
flects safety, iPod reflects cool,2 and Delaware reflects "business
friendly" among other key associations, such as judicial compe-
tence, apolitical decision making, flexibility, and understanding
corporate complexity.3 The Delaware brand is to corporate law
what Google is to search engines.'
* Assistant Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. B.A., 1996,
Wake Forest University; J.D., 1999, University of Pennsylvania; LL.M., 2001, University
of Cambridge, Pembroke College. I am grateful to Alan Palmiter, Lisa Fairfax, Jeremi
Duru, and Kami Chavis Simmons for reviewing drafts of this article and offering their in-
sightful comments. Any errors herein are my own. I also wish to thank Sidney Shapiro,
Ronald Wright, Derrick Boone, and Christopher Pietrusziewicz for their valuable insights,
David Lukach for his research assistance, and Wake Forest University School of Law for
its generous support. This article was presented at the 2007 Southeastern Association of
Law Schools ("SEALS") New Scholars Workshop.
1. John Gapper, Capitalist Punishment, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 29, 2005, at 16.
("The two key constituencies are stockholders and management, and we more or less go up
the fairway because if we go up either side, it would hurt us.").
2. See Karen DeYoung, The Pentagon Gets a Lesson From Madison Avenue; U.S.
Needs to Devise a Different 'Brand' to Win Over the Iraqi People, Study Advises, WASH.
POST, July 21, 2007, at Al.
3. Delaware is home to 61% of Fortune 500 companies. HARRIET SMITH WINDSOR,
DEL. DEP'T OF STATE, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 ANNUAL REPORT],
available at http://corp.delaware.gov/2006%2OAnnual%2OReport%20with%2OSignature%
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Brands are of immense value in today's business environment
and beyond.' Brands have been used to describe products (e.g.,
Coca-Cola),6 people (e.g., Al Gore),7 sports clubs (e.g., Manchester
United),' countries (e.g., Australia),9 states (e.g., Florida), I° and
20_2_.pdf. More than 70% of all initial public offerings ("IPOs") on U.S. exchanges in 2006
were incorporated in Delaware. Id.; see also Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Gov-
ernance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 350 (2001) ("The aggre-
gated choices of a majority of publicly traded U.S. corporations have resulted in a conver-
gence on the Delaware General Corporation Law as a de facto national corporate law.").
William T. Allen, Former Chancellor of the State of Delaware, describes Delaware's pre-
eminence:
My speculation is that the entrepreneurs and venture capitalists that choose
Delaware have it right. The IPO market and the secondary market trust the
system of the Delaware corporation law to be systematically fair. That, of
course, doesn't mean that all market participants will approve each element
of the system-or each court ruling or statutory amendment. Any particular
decision may generate disagreement, disapproval or dissent, but year upon
year the system taken as a whole plausibly balances deference to manage-
ment's need for broad discretion in deploying the firm's capital with protec-
tion of shareholder basic interest .... In doing so, Delaware law provides an
outstanding public service to the nation.
William T. Allen, Whence the Value-Added in Delaware Incorporation?, CORP. EDGE, (Div.
of Corp., Dover, Del.), Fall 1997, at 3, 3 (on file with author). The Corporate Edge was a
quarterly newsletter published by the Delaware Department of State's Division of Corpo-
rations. The newsletter went out of print in 2001.
4. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO SARBANES-OXLEY: UNDER-
STANDING How SARBANES-OXLEY AFFECTS YOUR BUSINESS 21 (2007) (referring to Dela-
ware as the Michael Jordan of corporate law). According to a recent Financial Times and
Millward Brown Optimor study, Google is the top global brand. MILLWARD BROWN
OPTIMOR, 2007 BRANDZ: TOP 100 MOST POWERFUL BRANDS 10, available at http://www.
scribd.com/doc/36187/Millward-Brown-Optimor BRANDZ-Top-Brand-Ranking-Report;
John Gapper, Global Brands: Companies Feel Benefit of Intangibles, FIN. TIMES (London),
Apr. 23, 2007, at 1. Other brands making up the top five include General Electric, Micro-
soft, Coca-Cola, and China Mobile. OPTIMOR, supra at 10.
5. See RITA CLIFTON ET AL., BRANDS AND BRANDING 28-30 (2003) (providing graphs
from studies intended to show the contribution of brand value to share price); Gapper, su-
pra note 4, at 1 (asserting the "proportion of intangible assets to shareholder value at For-
tune 500 companies has steadily risen, from about 50 per cent in 1980 to 70 per cent to-
day"). The ratio of brand value to share price may change from company to company and
industry to industry. See CLIFTON ET AL., supra, at 28-30.
6. See INTERBRAND, BEST GLOBAL BRANDS 2006, at 11 (listing Coca-Cola as the num-
ber one global brand), available at http://www.ourfishbowl.com/images/surveys/BGB06Re
port _072706.pdf.
7. See Ellen McGirt, Gore, FAST COMPANY, July/Aug. 2007, at 71 (describing "how an
epic loser engineered what may be the greatest brand makeover of our time").
8. Manchester United is one of the world's most popular sports brands. See Paul
Hetherington, Football: Armed Raids as Reds Go to War on Fakes, SUNDAY MIRROR (Lon-
don), July 22, 2001, at 60-61, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi qn4l6l/is
20010722/ai_n14535046 (citing MORI poll finding Manchester United has over fifty mil-
lion fans world-wide).
9. THE ANHOLT NATION BRANDS INDEX 4 (2007), available at http://www.nation
brandindex.com/documents/NBI-Q2-2007.pdf [hereinafter ANHOLT NATION BRANDS
INDEX] (finding that Australia has the 8th nation brand in the world).
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cities (e.g., Las Vegas and Paris).1 In the market for corporate
charters, Delaware, particularly its legal regime, is a brand. The
Small Wonder's preeminence in the market for corporate charters
has lasted for nearly a century and Delaware shows no sign of re-
linquishing its dominance. 2 Traditional accounts of Delaware's
10. See id. at 6. See ANHOLT STATES BRAND INDEX, HOW THE WORLD SEES THE STATES
5 (2006) (finding California and Florida are the top two "state brands" as seen by the
world).
11. See generally KEVIN LANE KELLER, STRATEGIC BRAND MANAGEMENT: BUILDING,
MEASURING, AND MANAGING BRAND EQUITY 10-21 (1998) (describing the range of items
that can be branded). There is even a journal dedicated to branding geographic locations.
See, e.g., David Gertner, Editorial, Place Branding: Dilemma or Reconciliation Between
Political Ideology and Economic Pragmatism?, 3 PLACE BRANDING AND PUB. DIPL. 3, 4
(2007), available at http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pbljournal/v3/nl/full/6000053a.hml
("Positive brand images have helped many economies boost their exports, and attract in-
vestments, businesses, factories, visitors, residents and talented people."). Branding is a
way for countries to improve upon a negative image or reinforce a positive perception. In
Delaware's case, it is the latter scenario. Notwithstanding, it is possible for something
with low quality to have significant brand loyalty. See DAVID A. AAKER, MANAGING BRAND
EQUITY: CAPITALIZING ON THE VALUE OF A BRAND NAME 39 (1991). Experts note "[clountry
brands have both intangible and tangible elements, such as the products or services of the
particular country." Gyorgy Szondi, The Role and Challenges of Country Brands in Transi-
tion Countries: The Central and Eastern European Experience, 3 PLACE BRANDING AND
PUB. DIPL. 8,9 (2007), available at http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pb/journal/u3/nl/full/
000044a.hml.
12. According to the Delaware Division of Corporations, more than 280,000 companies
are incorporated in Delaware. Division of Corporations, Delaware Department of State,
About Agency, http://www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited Mar. 29,
2008). Among these are 50% of all publicly traded companies and 60% of Fortune 500 com-
panies. Id. It is also important to note that between 82 and 90% of relocating firms choose
Delaware. See William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REV.
715, 718 (1998). Some commentators suggest that Delaware is not a monopolist. They con-
tend that, if Delaware was a monopolist and the market for corporate charters was non-
competitive, then one would expect Delaware to at least attract virtually all the corporate
charters of large publicly held corporations. Id. at 726. But, the percentage of corporations
in Delaware (i.e., only 50% publicly traded firms) is evidence of some degree competition.
But see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Recon-
sidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 579, 582 (2002) (con-
tending that Delaware is a monopolist according to the Herfindahl Index used in the anti-
trust context). Perhaps the important question is whether Delaware's controlling
approximately 50% market share creates enough market discipline to result in efficient or
adequate law. This article does not address this question, in part, because of the skepti-
cism concerning the use of competition as a proxy for optimal law. Although "monopoly" is
simply a descriptive term for market power, it often has a negative association. See Ralph
S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57
YALE. L.J. 1165, 1171 n.23 (1948) (noting the term "monopoly" has unavoidable negative
associations).
' The Small Wonder" is a nickname for the state of Delaware due to its size, the contri-
butions it has made to the country as a whole, and its beauty. Delaware Department of
State, Delaware Facts and Symbols, Delaware Government, http://portal.delaware.gov/del
facts/gov.shtml (last visited Mar. 29, 2008). Delaware ranks 49th in physical size among
U.S. states and it is the 45th most populous state. THE WORLD ALMANAC 2008, at 559
(2008). Delaware has dominated other states in charter competition since the 1920s. As
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dominance-race-to-the-bottom theories, race-to-the-top theories,
and their progeny-provide an incomplete descriptive assessment
of charter competition. Yet, the branding discussion provides an
important missing chapter in the story of Delaware's sustained
dominance. Unlike the proliferation of race theories over the past
thirty years, active debate exploring the connection between
branding 3 and Delaware's competitive advantage 14 in the corpo-
rate charter context is underdeveloped.
early as 1899, Delaware had fashioned a general incorporation law, which allowed it to
capitalize on the charter market when New Jersey renounced its role as the leading incor-
poration jurisdiction. The exodus of corporations from New Jersey to Delaware stemmed
from Woodrow Wilson's election as Governor of New Jersey in 1910. Wilson's passage of
employer liability legislation, known as the "seven sisters" legislation, led to the exodus.
Notably, Wilson is also associated with progressive legislation during his presidency, such
as the Clayton Act of 1914. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflec-
tions Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 664-65 (1974) (describing Delaware besting New
Jersey in the market for corporate charters); Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate
Chartermongering, 1875-1929, 49 J. OF ECON. HIST. 677, 688 (1989) (showing a graph de-
picting Delaware overtaking New Jersey in the market for corporate charters); E. Norman
Veasey, Musings from the Center of the Corporate Universe, 7 DEL. L. REV. 163, 166-67
(2004) [hereinafter Veasey, Center of Universe] (describing the exodus of firms from New
Jersey to Delaware).
13. See Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal
Structures, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (2006) [hereinafter Fleischer, Brand New Deal]
(noting branding has received little attention from legal scholars outside of the trademark
area); see also Shahar J. Dilbary, Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for Protect-
ing "Irrational Beliefs", 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 605 (2007) (addressing branding in the
trademark context); Victor Fleischer, The MasterCard IPO: Protecting the Priceless Brand,
12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 137 (2007) [hereinafter Fleischer, MasterCard IPO] (describing
the branding effect of legal infrastructure); D. Gordon Smith, The "Branding Effect" of
Contracts, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 189 (2007) (discussing branding effects in the contrac-
tual context).
14. See generally Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in
Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998) (arguing indeterminate case law enhances
Delaware's position in the charter market). Kamar's article offers the most developed dis-
cussion of competitive advantage in corporate law literature. He asserts that Delaware
has several competitive advantages that other states find difficult to replicate. Id. at 1908.
Moreover, Kamar argues that indeterminacy in Delaware's fiduciary duty case law en-
hances Delaware's market position. Id. In making the above claims, Kamar raises the pos-
sibility that Delaware uses its judge-oriented corporate law to stifle its rival jurisdictions.
However, Kamar's account is not the only articulation of the indeterminacy principle. Ian
Ayres identified a similar concept with respect to amendments of the corporate code:
Among many legitimate motivations, Delaware may similarly be moved to
enact innocuous and arbitrary amendments to its corporate law in order to
generate additional rents and make its code more difficult to copy .... [Tihe
Delaware bar may prefer seemingly innocuous change that gives rise to addi-
tional litigation. New statutes often give rise to an initial wave of clarifying
litigation so that the Delaware bar (much like the bluebook editors) may have
an additional incentive to lobby for statutory change.
Ian Ayres, Supply-Side Inefficiencies in Corporate Charter Competition: Lessons from Pat-
ents, Yachting and Bluebooks, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 558 (1995); see also Douglas M.
1132 [Vol. 42:1129
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A fair question one might ask is, "Why has branding been
largely ignored in the discussion of Delaware's dominance?" The
short answer is skepticism surrounding the branding concept.
This skepticism is rooted in the belief that (i) consumers, with
imperfect information, are duped into making decisions based
upon intangible factors, and (ii) producers use branding to insu-
late their market share from price competition and create barri-
ers to entry, which distort competition.15 But, this view of brand-
ing is too negative, narrow, and paternalistic."
The Delaware brand is more than mere marketing or advertis-
ing; it is a mixture of tangible and intangible elements that firms
value.17 The Delaware incorporation decision is the purchase of a
branded product. The purchase of a branded product actually in-
volves the purchase of two bundled products-a tangible product
(i.e., physical product and performance characteristics) and an in-
tangible product (i.e., psychological associations and perceptions
related to what the brand represents, which may or may not re-
late to performance characteristics). Successful brands, in most
cases, must reflect truth or risk being discredited." For Dela-
ware, this could mean corporate migration or federal preemption.
This article does not focus on how Delaware actively works to cul-
tivate its brand, 9 but simply acknowledges the undeniable im-
Branson, Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an Interest Group Analysis of Corporate
Law, 43 VAND. L. REv. 85, 90-92 (1990) (describing the Delaware corporate bar and its
influence on corporate law); Carney, supra note 12, at 724 n.40 (discussing how "uncer-
tainty is income enhancing" for Delaware lawyers). Kamar's indeterminacy story simply
switches the principal character from Ayres' story (the corporate bar) to the judiciary.
Both accounts suggest "Delaware may have an incentive to differentiate its product for the
sake of differentiation itself." Ayres, supra at 559; cf. Kamar, supra at 1911 ("Delaware
can thus profit from adopting ambiguous legal standards, even if they render Delaware
law suboptimal.").
15. See Fleischer, Brand New Deal, supra note 13, at 1630; see also Brown, supra note
12, at 1169, 1180-84 (adopting a narrow and negative view of branding).
16. This limited vantage point views branding as useful only to the extent it provides
information concerning the product or service. Similarly, the economic purist would view
information as the only useful function of branding. See Brown, supra note 12, at 1169
("Most advertising [or branding], however, is designed not to inform, but to persuade and
influence.").
17. Cf. Fleischer, Brand New Deal, supra note 13, at 1604 ("Branding... is more than
marketing.").
18. See AAKER, supra note 11, at 97 (noting actual quality must translate into per-
ceived quality).
19. Delaware's governmental actors, particularly the Delaware Secretary of State's
Division of Corporations, actively market Delaware business formation within the United
States and in overseas markets. See HARRIET SMITH WINDSOR, DEL. DEP'T OF STATE,
11332008]
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pact of branding effects on incorporation decisions and U.S. cor-
porate governance.
As mentioned above, Delaware supplies a service or product
that corporations demand 20 in the form of a package.21 The incor-
poration decision can be described as the purchase of a state's
corporate law regime.22 Corporate managers, assisted by lawyers,
usually determine where a company should incorporate. In the
United States, the law of the state of incorporation, and not the
operational headquarters, governs the internal affairs of the cor-
poration.23 In essence, the perpetuation of the internal affairs
doctrine results from an informal arrangement between the fed-
eral government and the states because Congress has the ulti-
mate authority over interstate commerce via the Commerce
Clause.24 Therefore, Congress, within its discretion, can preempt
aspects of state corporate law.
The incorporation decision is akin to some form of cost-benefit
calculus involving myriad criteria. The balance of such factors
frequently leads firms to choose Delaware. Generally, the incor-
poration decision occurs in two scenarios: (i) new incorporations
involving initial public offerings ("IPOs") and (ii) reincorporations
involving mergers or other ownership changes. 25 Pre-IPO incor-
porations are relatively costless compared with after a firm goes
DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS, 2005 ANNuAL REPORT 1 (2006), available at http://corp.dela
ware.gov/2005%20doc%20ar.pdf. ("Over the last five years, Governor Ruth Ann Minner,
and I along with other Delaware officials, have logged tens of thousands of miles to share
Delaware's incorporation story around the world, from North America to Europe to Asia.").
Irrespective of whether state actors make a concerted effort to brand the jurisdiction, how-
ever, the effects are the same. Moreover, the strength of the Delaware brand arguably re-
duces the need to actively market the legal regime.
20. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 228 (1985) [hereinafter Romano, Law as a Product].
21. The distinction between what constitutes a product or service experience is often
blurred. One may take a stereo home, but not a restaurant. See CLIFTON ET AL., supra note
5, at 105-06.
22. Under this scenario, Delaware law provides the rules and the judicial system pro-
vides the procedures. Within this regime there are multiple actors, such as the judiciary,
the corporate bar, and the Division of Corporations. This is an oversimplification, but use-
ful nonetheless.
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 cmt. a (1971) referring to
§ 303. For example, although Coca-Cola's operational headquarters is in Georgia, its in-
ternal affairs are governed by Delaware law.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
25. See Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1559, 1568-70 (2002) [hereinafter Daines, Incorporation Choices].
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public.26 Reincorporations generally require a vote by the share-
holders and other regulatory requirements, such as the prepara-
tion of a proxy statement and sponsoring a general shareholder
vote.27 Studies reveal the incorporation decisions of publicly
traded firms are not necessarily a choice between Delaware and
fifty other jurisdictions, as traditionally envisioned by race com-
petition theorists.28 Instead, firms experience the more limited
choice between Delaware and their home state, i.e., the site of
principal operations. 29 Empirical studies show Delaware faces no
formidable rival for incorporations of publicly traded firms, espe-
cially when firms decide to incorporate out-of-state.3" Therefore,
state competition for corporate charters is best described as a
"leisurely walk" rather than a vigorous sprint.31 The incorpora-
tion decision, like most purchase decisions, is seldom based upon
total or perfect information. In product or service markets, com-
peting firms produce products or services that have points of par-
ity and points of differentiation.3 2 In many cases, competing
products share many of the same tangible features.33 Even where
a product's physical characteristics distinguish it from competing
products, competing firms can, in most cases, replicate these tan-
gible points of differentiation. As a result, many markets are
characterized by a trend toward commoditization. Branding,
26. Stephen P. Ferris, Robert M. Lawless & Gregory Noronha, The Influence of State
Legal Environments on Firm Incorporation Decisions and Values, 2 J.L. ECON. & POLY 1,
10 (2006).
27. Id.
28. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 575; Daines, Incorporation Choices,
supra note 25, at 1562.
29. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 575-76 (describing the impact of
home-state bias). A number of studies have attempted to uncover why firms incorporate in
their home state as opposed to incorporating out-of-state. Explanations for the home-state
bias include, but are not limited to, local favoritism, lower transaction costs, and the pref-
erences of law firms advising on IPOs. See id. at 573-74.
30. See id. at 566-67 tbls.1 & 2.
31. See id. at 554-55. The lack of significant market discipline does not adequately
address the question of whether Delaware law is optimal.
32. Kevin Keller asserts "[p]oints of difference are those associations that are unique
to the brand that are also strongly held and favorably evaluated by consumers." KELLER,
supra note 11, at 116. Alternatively, "[p]oints of parity, on the other hand, are those asso-
ciations that are not necessarily unique to the brand but may in fact be shared with other
brands." Id.
33. Id. at 117. For example, cola drinks often share the same physical properties and
components. Yet, Coke and Pepsi maintain significant market share.
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however, offers a powerful point of differentiation and serves as a
key decision-making heuristic.
Delaware's exceptional performance in the chartering market,
like an individual firm in a product or service market, results
from multiple sources of competitive advantage-particularly dif-
ferentiation advantages.3 4 The Delaware brand is a type of differ-
entiation advantage, which explains Delaware's dominance and
why Delaware's legal regime is not a commodity. If Delaware's le-
gal regime were a commodity, one would expect firms to be indif-
ferent to the regime and base their decisions on features such as
price, convenience, and other tangible characteristics without a
concern for the brand.35 This is not the case in the state charter
market where the Delaware brand creates a long-term competi-
tive advantage. Facing a downward sloping (i.e., inelastic) de-
mand curve, Delaware can extract a higher price or premium
than other states in the charter market because of its brand.36
These higher prices take the form of franchise taxes and attor-
ney's fees.37 Unlike other states, Delaware's corporate charter
business operates as a profit center and is a significant part of
Delaware's economic viability.3" Delaware serves the high-end
market segment of large publicly traded firms.
34. Differentiation advantages are competitive advantages based upon the unique at-
tributes of a service or product as opposed to a cost advantage. For a discussion of differen-
tiation advantages, see discussion infra Part III.A.2.
35. See AAKER, supra note 11, at 39.
36. See Carney, supra note 12, at 726.
37. Id.
38. Franchise taxes range from a minimum of $35 to a maximum of $165,000. See Di-
vision of Corporations, Delaware Department of State, How to Calculate Franchise Taxes,
http://corp.delaware.gov/frtaxcalc.shtml (last visited Mar. 29, 2008). As expected, large
publicly held corporations, those with the most authorized shares, absorb most of the tax
burden. See id. For over thirty years, the amount of franchise taxes as a percentage of to-
tal Delaware tax revenues has remained above 15%. Roberta Romano, Competition for
Corporate Charters and the Lasson of Takeover Statutes, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 845
(1993) [hereinafter Romano, Competition for Corporate Charters. Delaware's chartering
business accounts for a significant percentage of state revenues. In 2006, business fran-
chise taxes constituted approximately 16.2% of Delaware's state revenues. Specifically,
franchise taxes accounted for $512.3 million of a total revenue of $3,169.9 million. See DIV.
OF ACCOUNTING, DELAWARE DEP'T OF FIN., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT
110, 136 (2006) [hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT], available at
http://accounting.delaware.gov/2006cafr.pdf. Including LLC/LP annual tax, business entity
fees, and UCC fees, the Division of Corporations revenues amounted to $665.3 million in
2006. 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 2. This is 21% of total tax revenues. See id.
Franchise taxes increased from $357.7 million in 1997 to $533.6 million in 2001, before
falling slightly to $512.3 million in 2006. See COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT
1136 [Vol. 42:1129
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Most of the debate surrounding Delaware's dominant position
in state charter competition focuses on race-to-the-top versus
race-to-the-bottom theories, en route to determining whether cor-
porate federalism results in optimal corporate law.39 As a general
matter, race-to-the-top theories contend Delaware's success in the
corporate charter market reflects the qualitative superiority of its
law.4" Race-to-the-top theories presume manager and shareholder
interests converge in the long run because managers realize pro-
moting shareholder wealth lessens the likelihood of bankruptcy
and takeover, which threaten managerial incumbency. This
model, of course, assumes an efficient market and the absence of
other confounding factors.
Alternatively, race-to-the-bottom theorists assert that states, in
order to attract incorporating firms, adopt minimum standards
that limit manager accountability to the dismay of sharehold-
ers.41 Due to these minimum standards, race-to-the-bottom theo-
at 136. Meanwhile, the number of filers of franchise taxes increased from $216,735 in 1997
to $254,538 in 2001, before decreasing to $239,824 in 2006. See id.
39. See generally Cary, supra note 12, at 666 (asserting state competition is a race-to-
the-bottom benefiting management, sometimes at the expense of shareholders, and that
this state of affairs demands a greater federal role); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law,
Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 256
(1977) (asserting state competition is a race to the top benefiting shareholders); see also
Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 556 (asserting Delaware has a monopoly on out of
state charters); Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition
for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1064 (2000) (asserting Delaware sustains
its advantage through judge-made corporate law); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The
Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN L. REV. 679, 684 (2002) [hereinafter
Kamar, Myth] (asserting Delaware is the only state to truly compete for incorporations);
Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1208 (2001) (asserting Delaware employs price discrimination
through franchise taxes and litigation-intensive substantive law); Marcel Kahan & Ed-
ward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV.
1573, 1578 (2005) (asserting that Delaware and the federal government complement each
other by working on the areas the other cannot regulate as effectively); Mark J. Roe,
Delaware's Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2494 (2005) [hereinafter Roe, Delaware's Poli-
tics] (asserting the relationship between Delaware and federal actors is more important
than any state-to-state race); Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588,
590 (2003) [hereinafter Roe, Delaware's Competition] (asserting there can be no pure state-
to-state race because of the threat of federal intervention).
40. Cf. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416, 418 (1956) (predicting competition between states will lead to an efficient match be-
tween demands of citizens for public goods and public goods supported by the state).
41. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557, 559 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting in part) ("Lesser States, eager for the revenue derived from the traffic in charters,
had removed safeguards from their own incorporation laws .... The race was one not of
diligence but of laxity."); Cary, supra note 12, at 663 ("Delaware is both the sponsor and
the victim of a system contributing to the deterioration of corporation standards. This un-
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rists often argue further federalization is necessary to protect
shareholder interests from managerial shirking. Federalization
can take place in two ways: (i) via the creation of a federal char-
tering option or (ii) preemption via federal lawmaking, as is cur-
rently done .42 Despite having different views concerning the op-
timality or sub-optimality of Delaware law, race theories attempt
to explain, although incompletely, the motivations of lawmakers
and corporate managers.43
This article, through an analysis of branding effects in the
chartering market, offers a new paradigm to explain Delaware's
sustained dominance. By addressing Delaware's value-producing
activities in the aggregate-both tangible and intangible-this
article provides novel insight into how companies approach their
incorporation decisions. This article concludes that the strength
of the Delaware brand has significant implications not only for
Delaware and incorporating firms, but also for U.S. corporate
governance.
Part I briefly addresses the limitations of existing corporate
regulatory competition theories. This section argues existing
regulatory competition theories tend to overstate the explanatory
power of competition; understate the impact of intangible factors
on incorporation decisions; and devalue or denigrate the judicial
role by characterizing every decision by Delaware courts as de-
fensive, calculating, rent-seeking, or opportunistic.
Part II demonstrates that the Delaware brand is one of the
most important and most overlooked competitive advantages ex-
plaining Delaware's dominance. This article adopts a broad defi-
nition of "brand," which reflects both the tangible and intangible
aspects of a product or service experience. This section argues the
Delaware brand generates positive benefits for Delaware and in-
corporating firms. The benefits for incorporating firms may in-
clude psychological benefits independent of Delaware's tangible
happy state of affairs stem(s) in great part from the movement toward the least common
denominator . . . ."); see also Roe, Delaware's Competition, supra note 39, at 594-96 (ex-
plaining the race-to-the-bottom theory).
42. See Roe, Delaware's Competition, supra note 39, at 607-34 (discussing the dis-
placement of state corporate law).
43. Recent theories explaining Delaware's dominance, like Mark Roe's political ac-
count of federal-state interaction, cast doubt on the explanatory power of traditional race
theories. See generally Roe, Delaware's Politics, supra note 39.
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performance characteristics. These intangible attributes have re-
ceived less emphasis in the charter competition literature.
Part III first explains the operation of competitive advantage.
There are two broad categories of competitive advantage-cost
advantages and differentiation advantages. This article contends
that differentiation advantages, such as the Delaware brand, play
a pivotal role in incorporation decisions. Secondly, this section
explores Delaware's multiple sources of differentiation advantage,
which are tangible and intangible. Tangible elements of the
Delaware legal regime include a flexible corporate statute; case
law and precedent; a specialized and proficient court system; and
a stable political climate. Outside of Delaware's judicial system
(i.e., case law and judiciary) and its stable political climate, Dela-
ware's tangible differentiation advantages can be replicated by
rival jurisdictions. Delaware's intangible elements, however, are
not easily replicated and include reputation, visibility to top man-
agement, time-in-business, customer lists, competitors, academic
curriculum, and discursive debate. These tangible and intangible
elements are the building blocks of the Delaware brand.
Finally, Part IV explores the implications of the branding story
on the corporate regulatory competition debate. These implica-
tions are: (i) the branding discussion provides a more compelling
account of Delaware's dominance than traditional theories; (ii)
maintaining the strength of the Delaware brand, in part, depends
on the perception that the Delaware judiciary engages in princi-
pled lawmaking; (iii) the Delaware brand is extremely durable
and resilient, which enables Delaware to maintain its competitive
edge even during periods of turbulence, as well as prevent exten-
sive federal encroachment; and (iv) the strength of the Delaware
brand contributes to the overall strength of U.S. corporate gov-
ernance.
I. LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING EXPLANATIONS FOR
DELAWARE'S PREEMINENCE
Delaware's dominance in the corporate charter competition
gives rise to one incontrovertible fact: large publicly traded firms
have, and continue to have, a strong preference for Delaware's le-
gal regime. The crucial inquiry is "why?" Existing regulatory
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competition theories, such as race theories and their progeny,
provide some, but not all, of the answers to this vexing question.44
The first shortcoming of traditional theories of corporate regu-
latory competition is they provide an incomplete descriptive ac-
count of Delaware's dominance and overstate their explanatory
value. Contrary to the assertions of both Delaware proponents
and detractors, the presence or lack of competition provides nei-
ther a comprehensive qualitative assessment of Delaware corpo-
rate law nor a justification for federal intervention. The actual
lack of robust competition undermines race-to-the-top theorists'
claims that Delaware's law is dominant because it is the best on
the market.4" On the other hand, race-to-the-bottom theorists as-
sume Delaware panders to management by adopting minimum
standards at the expense of shareholders. The diversity of Dela-
ware judicial decisions and empirical data, however, do not sup-
port this assumption either.46 Thus, competition alone is not an
44. See Fisch, supra note 39, at 1062 (discussing factors that weaken the explanatory
power of regulatory competition theories. Factors that weaken the explanatory power of
regulatory competition theories include: (i) minor differences in substantive law across ju-
risdictions; (ii) empirical analysis fails to demonstrate superiority or inferiority of Dela-
ware law; and (iii) Delaware seems immune from competition. See id. With respect to the
third factor one must consider the federal government as a potential threat. See Kahan &
Rock, supra note 39, at 1584 (asserting Delaware is at the forefront of state-made corpo-
rate law and subject to change only if highly motivated parties act through Congress); Roe,
Delaware's Politics, supra note 39, at 2499 (describing Delaware as leading other states in
making corporate law, though there is the possibility of federal displacement).
45. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1767 (2006) [hereinafter Hamermesh, Policy Foundations]; see
also Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV.
709, 752 (1987) [hereinafter Romano, State Competition] (adopting a position close to Win-
ter's position that state competition is beneficial); Winter, supra note 39, at 251-52 (as-
serting state competition is a race to the top benefiting shareholders); Daniel R. Fischel,
The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Cor-
poration Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913, 917 (1982) (asserting shareholders would not agree
to incorporate in a state that was biased against them).
46. See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON.
525, 525 (2001) [hereinafter Daines, Firm Value] (finding higher Tobin's Q measurements
for Delaware's corporations); Daines, Incorporation Choices, supra note 25, at 1560 (noting
the impact of Delaware reincorporation on share price); Romano, Competition for Corpo-
rate Charters, supra note 38, at 848 (noting several studies have found positive price ef-
fects following Delaware incorporation); Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware
Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32, 33 (2004) (finding statistical evidence that firms incorpo-
rated in Delaware were worth more than non-Delaware firms between 1991-1996, but that
this trend subsided after 1996); Allen, supra note 3, at 3 (asserting that reincorporation
normally results in an immediate increase in stock price). But see Lucian Bebchuk, Alma
Cohen & Allen Ferrel, What Matters in Corporate Governance?, (Harvard Law Sch. John
M. Olin Center, Discussion Paper No. 491, 2004) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrel,
What Matters?], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=593423 (finding six pro-entrench-
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adequate proxy for the substantive superiority or inferiority of
Delaware corporate law. Scholars continue to struggle with the
question of whether Delaware corporate law is substantively su-
perior to other jurisdictions. As a result of the difficulty in ascer-
taining the substantive superiority of Delaware corporate law,
there has been a proliferation of non-substantive theories to ex-
plain Delaware's preeminence. 47 The answer to the substantive
question of quality is complicated because it depends on a number
of variables, including: (i) the type of corporate decision at issue-
ownership, enterprise, and oversight;41 (ii) the observer's vantage
point-i.e., management, shareholders, institutional sharehold-
ers, creditors, or other stakeholders; (iii) the desired policy
value-efficiency or fairness; (iv) inter-temporal considerations-
short-term versus long-term impact on business value; and (v) the
lack of consensus on interpretive methodologies used by judges-
formalism, pragmatism, or legal realism. At a minimum, Dela-
ware's dominance reflects a clear preference for its brand and a
degree of congruence between the values embodied in its law and
business values. But, business values alone (e.g., efficiency) do
not equate to optimal law. The branding account of state charter
ment aspects of corporate governance have a negative effect on shareholder value).
47. See Fisch, supra note 39, at 1062-64; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future As
History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implica-
tions, 93 Nw. U.L. REV. 641, 703 (1999) (describing a herding theory for analyzing Dela-
ware's preeminence); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEx. L. REV. 469, 469 (1987) (describing an inter-
est-group theory for analyzing Delaware's preeminence); Roberta Romano, Corporate Law
and Corporate Governance, 5 INDUS. CORP. CHANGE 277, 277-79 (1996) [hereinafter
Romano, Corporate Law] (describing a transaction cost method for analyzing Delaware's
preeminence). Interest-group theories assert that rent-seeking interest groups make calcu-
lated moves to attract charters. These theories contend interest group concerns are out-
come determinative. Some commentators assert that any movements by Delaware courts
are due to the threat of federal intervention. See Roe, Delaware's Competition, supra note
39, at 591-92; Roe, Delaware's Politics, supra note 39, at 2494; see also Sean J. Griffith,
Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55
DUKE L.J. 1, 7-8 (2005) (asserting the duty of good faith evolved in the "sturm und drang
in corporate governance" after the public scandals of Worldcom, Enron, and Tyco brought
into question the current American corporate governance model).
48. See generally E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate Governance
In America, 52 BUS. LAW. 393, 394 (1997) [hereinafter Veasey, Defining Tension] (discuss-
ing the types of decisions Delaware courts address, which include enterprise, ownership,
and oversight decisions). Enterprise decisions are standard decisions made by manage-
ment, such as the decision to build a foreign production plant or what products to produce.
See id. Ownership decisions involve ownership changes, such as mergers, acquisitions, and
corporate takeovers. See id. Oversight decisions concern managers' monitoring role, such
as ensuring employees execute their responsibilities in compliance with the law. See id.
Delaware common law duties reflect an attempt to balance corporate efficiency with equi-
table principles.
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competition acknowledges that different stakeholders may per-
ceive the Delaware brand differently based upon their own needs
and agendas.49 In short, the branding account of Delaware's
domination is an intermediate theory, which resides between ac-
counts of efficient competition and accounts citing other determi-
nants, such as politics, history, and interest groups.
Secondly, existing explanations for Delaware's dominance focus
on tangible institutional factors, such as Delaware's court system,
to the exclusion of intangible factors, such as reputation and cus-
tomer lists. Therefore, existing approaches underestimate the
role intangible attributes of Delaware's legal regime play in firm
incorporation decisions. It is the interaction of tangible and in-
tangible attributes that account for Delaware's sustained domi-
nance and create the unique Delaware brand.
Finally, theories of corporate regulatory competition have a
tendency to underestimate the prospect of principled judicial
lawmaking. In the search for an alternative explanation for Dela-
ware's sustained dominance-such as the threat of federal inter-
vention, corporate migration, tax revenues, interest groups, or
politics-there is a tendency to minimize the role of principled ju-
dicial lawmaking.5 ° Principled lawmaking occurs when Delaware
judges analyze the complex cases before them, acknowledge
precedent, and balance competing values, such as efficiency, eq-
uity, authority, and accountability.5' This process is apolitical and
49. See CLIFTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 81.
50. But, all moves made by Delaware courts cannot be defensive. See, e.g., Stone v.
Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 372-73 (Del. 2006) (deciding not to take a prescriptive or proscriptive
approach to corporate legal compliance in contrast to Sarbanes-Oxley reforms at the fed-
eral level); see also Hamermesh, Policy Foundations, supra note 45, at 1770 n.93 (noting
that the Delaware Supreme Court's remand of Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000)
predated Enron).
51. E. Norman Veasey describes the Delaware approach:
The enabling model, patterned after the Delaware approach, is based on a
few fundamental statutory guideposts and latitude for private ordering, with
primary reliance on self-governance centered around judicial decisionmaking
in applying fiduciary duties to fact-intensive settings.
A word of caution is that the judge-made law must not be of a free-
wheeling or ad hoc quality. It must involve a disciplined and stable stare de-
cisis analysis based on precedent and a coherent economic rationale. The pri-
vate ordering aspect of it must provide ex ante the contractual stockholder
protections deemed important, as distinct from ex post judicial rewriting of
the contractual framework.
E. Norman Veasey, Should Corporation Law Inform Aspirations for Good Corporate Gov-
ernance Practices-or Vice Versa?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2179-80 (2001) [hereinafter
Veasey, Aspirations]; see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 39, at 1612 (describing Delaware
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earnest. Any model of corporate regulatory competition must ac-
knowledge that every movement or decision by the Delaware ju-
diciary (i.e., the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware
Supreme Court) is not defensive, calculating, rent-seeking, or op-
portunistic. Whether or not one agrees with a particular decision
should not color the entire perception of Delaware's legal regime
and its judicial actors. William Cary's seminal race-to-the-bottom
article asserted the Delaware judiciary was conflicted and could
not be expected to deliver objective and independent pronounce-
ments. 2 Cary's view is too negative. Maintaining the strength of
the Delaware brand is contingent on the perception of a Delaware
judiciary engaged in principled lawmaking. Otherwise, a percep-
tion of strong judicial bias would raise the threat of federal pre-
emption. For this reason, principled judicial lawmaking is an in-
dispensable element of the Delaware brand and brand
maintenance provides positive incentives for Delaware legal ac-
tors.53
II. THE DELAWARE BRAND
If one were to poll MBA students around the country and ask
them the simple question, "If you want to incorporate a business,
where do you do it?," many students would answer Delaware "be-
cause it is business-friendly and most publicly traded companies
choose to incorporate there." But, Delaware is not the only busi-
ness friendly jurisdiction, nor is it, according to some accounts,
the most business friendly.54 Notably, the same group of students
would not be able to provide a detailed account of Delaware's
unique features.5 This basic illustration reflects the importance
of perception and the role intangibles play in the decision-making
process. These widely held perceptions illustrate that Delaware's
legal regime has brand status. Yet, the Delaware brand is one of
the most important and most overlooked differentiation advan-
judge-made law as technical and apolitical because it is created by experienced appointed
judges rather than through legislative and political processes).
52. See Cary, supra note 12, at 670.
53. See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
54. See generally Ferris, Lawless & Noronha, supra note 26, at 8 (acknowledging that
Delaware does not have the highest legal environment measure ("LEM") score, which is
used to indicate a state's reputation for timely response to new developments in corporate
law).
55. See discussion infra Part III.
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tages explaining Delaware's dominance. This section explores the
importance of branding in the corporate charter context.
A. Toward a Definition of Branding
Although "branding" is important to business strategy and is a
popular term in the business lexicon, it has received only minor
consideration by legal scholars, particularly in the corporate gov-
ernance context.56 Nonetheless, branding concepts are applied to
a range of items from geographical locations to persons. In addi-
tion, numerous studies illustrate how brands allow firms to se-
cure high profits and sustain customer demand. 7 Despite its un-
deniable importance, branding, at times, seems like an
amorphous concept without a precise definition.5" In a narrow
sense, branding describes advertising, marketing activities, and
intangible assets like trademarks and other intellectual property.
This narrow perspective underestimates the broader impact of
branding. Such a narrow view can also lead to the formation of a
negative view of branding as synonymous with opportunistic be-
havior, which preys upon customer information asymmetries.
This negative view is misconceived and misplaced in the corpo-
rate charter context.
56. See, e.g., Fleischer, Brand New Deal, supra note 13, at 1582-83, 1588-89. Victor
Fleischer is the only legal scholar to offer significant discussion of branding effects in the
corporate law context.
57. See CLIFTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 27-30.
58. See THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 488 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d
ed. 1989) (defining brand as "the impression of a product in the minds of potential users or
consumers"); THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 254 (Stuart Berg Flexner ed., 2d ed. 1987)
(defining brand as "kind, grade, or make, as indicated by a stamp, trademark, or the like"
and "a kind or variety of something distinguished by some distinctive characteristic");
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 268 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1993)
(defining brand as "a class of goods identified as being the product of a single firm or
manufacturer"); see also CLIFTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 13 (providing two more defini-
tions of brand). Brands are not just difficult to define. Their impact is difficult to measure.
See id. at 28-29; see also AAKER, supra note 11, at 21-26 (describing five different tests for
measuring the value of a brand); V. Srinivasan, Chan Su Park & Dae Ryun Chang, An
Approach to the Measurement, Analysis, and Prediction of Brand Equity and Its Sources,
51 MGMT. SC. 1433, 1434 (2005) (asserting brand value can be measured by examining
three factors: brand awareness, attribute perception biases, and nonattribute preference).
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In a broad sense, branding describes a range of elements that
form a complete service or product experience." The branding
concept has traditionally focused on points of differentiation, i.e.,
unique benefits, which set a product or service apart from the
competition.6" According to Michael Porter, branding is a "higher-
order" competitive advantage.6 Higher-order advantages like
branding require more "advanced skills and capabilities such as
specialized and highly trained personnel, internal technical capa-
bility, and, often, close relationships with leading customers."62
This article adopts a broad definition of branding, which views
the purchase of a branded product as the purchase of two bundled
products-a tangible product (i.e., physical product) and an in-
tangible product (e.g., psychological associations and perceptions
related to what the Delaware brand represents, which may not
relate to tangible features).63 Kevin Keller provides the following
insights on brands:
A brand is a product but one that adds other dimensions differentiat-
ing it in some way from other products designed to satisfy the same
need. These differences may be rational and tangible-related to
product performance of the brand-or more symbolic, emotional, or
intangible-related to what the brand represents.
The key to branding is that consumers perceive differences among
brands in a product category.
64
59. See generally Natalie Mizik & Robert Jacobson, Talk About Brand Strategy, HARV.
Bus. REV., Oct. 2005, at 24, 26 (discussing the effect of brand differentiation); Roland T.
Rust, Valarie A. Zeithaml, & Katherine N. Lemon, Customer-Centered Brand Manage-
ment, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept. 2004, at 110, 116-17 (explaining that customer equity is
made of value equity, brand equity, and relationship equity, and examining the drivers of
brand equity); Kirsten D. Sandberg, Building Brand: A Road Map, HARV. Bus. REV., July
2001, 9, 9 (discussing the importance of customer awareness and experience in branding).
60. See Kevin Lane Keller, Brian Sternthal & Alice Tybout, Three Questions You Need
To Ask About Your Brand, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept. 2002, at 80, 81 [hereinafter Keller,
Three Questions]. Brand studies show that the most important predictor of new product
success and broad product awareness is having a point of differentiation. See AAKER, su-
pra note 11, at 158; see also Brown, supra note 12, at 1177 ("A differentiated brand, like a
patent, a secret process, control over distribution channels, or control of raw materials, is
a safeguard against the risks of competition.").
61. See MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 50 (1990)
[hereinafter PORTER, NATIONS].
62. Id.
63. Cf. Dilbary, supra note 13, at 607-09 (asserting customers receive three bundled
products when purchasing a branded product).
64. KELLER, supra note 11, at 38 (emphasis added).
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Some brands create competitive advantage primarily through
product and technological innovation (e.g., Sony),65 whereas other
brands create competitive advantage predominately through non-
product-related factors (e.g., Gucci).6 6 In the latter category, in-
tangible image associations differentiate the product and, in cer-
tain cases, may be the only significant distinguishing feature in a
specific product category.6
By analogy, Delaware's ability to provide a unique branded
customer experience explains its dominance and favor among
large publicly traded firms. Delaware's brand equity is tied both
to tangible aspects of its service and to various intangible fac-
tors.68 Firm perceptions of the Delaware brand may be created
unintentionally or intentionally.69 Irrespective of whether Dela-
ware proactively attempts to build its own brand, the effects are
the same.7 °
65. Examples of Sony innovation include the Sony Walkman and Playstation. Sony
invests in product development and technology.
66. See KELLER, supra note 11, at 5. Gucci relies heavily on luxury branding and im-
age to differentiate its products.
67. See id.
68. See Kevin Lane Keller, The Brand Report Card, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 2000, at
147-48 [hereinafter Keller, Brand Report Card] (asserting brands provide a product, but
also an image, a service, and many other tangible and intangible factors). David Aaker
defines brand equity as a "set of brand assets and liabilities linked to the brand-its name
and symbols-that add value to, or subtract value from, a product or service. These assets
include brand loyalty, name awareness, perceived quality, and associations." AAKER, supra
note 11, at 269. According to David Aaker, there are multiple dimensions of brand equity:
brand loyalty, awareness, perceived quality, and associations. Id. at 17-20 (explaining
various elements of brand equity). These dimensions are often interconnected. Perceived
quality reflects the idea that a product's visibility is the result of quality. See id. at 18. As-
sociations reflect the idea that a visible spokesperson or symbol would only endorse or re-
flect a quality product. Id. Awareness simply suggests that a recognized name matters.
See id. at 19. Brand loyalty reflects the idea that it is more expensive to gain new custom-
ers, but it is inexpensive to keep old ones, even if switching costs are low. See id. This
situation most likely occurs because of some degree of customer satisfaction with the
brand. See id. Brand loyalty differs from other dimensions, because it does not exist in the
absence of a prior use experience. Thus, brand loyalty is a key component of brand equity,
for the following reason:
If customers are indifferent to the brand and, in fact, buy with respect to fea-
tures, price, and convenience with little concern to the brand name, there is
likely little equity. If, on the other hand, they continue to purchase the brand
even in the face of competitors with superior features, price, and convenience,
substantial value exists in the brand and perhaps in its symbol and slogans.
Id. at 39. Existing customers can provide brand exposure and reassurance. Id. at 19.
69. This article neither concludes nor attempts to answer the question whether Dela-
ware actively engages in aggressive branding of its legal regime. The strength of the
Delaware brand may actually suggest Delaware spends less in cultivating its brand.
70. See CLIFTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 20 ("Reputation is paramount, and companies
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B. The Beneficiaries of Branding
1. Producers
Brands create value for producers like Delaware. For produc-
ers, branding creates differences among products in a category,
which results in profits. Yet, the importance to producers of
maintaining a strong brand is not simply to extract a premium
price in the form of franchise taxes or attorney's fees; it is to se-
cure future demand.7' In this sense, branding from the producer
perspective is prospective.72 Branding arguably has three func-
tions-to inform, to secure demand, and to persuade.73 The for-
mer two functions are much less controversial than the latter. As
a practical matter, it is often difficult to disentangle these func-
tions. For producers, a brand is a potent device to distinguish
one's product from competitors and create an aversion to substi-
tutes.74 In addition to insulating producers from competition,
brands are durable sources of competitive advantage, which pro-
vide added protection in the event of product or service failure.75
In sum, brands allow producers to secure profits, secure future
demand, and withstand periods of turbulence.
2. Customers
From the customer perspective, strong brands create customer
value because they reduce both the effort and risk involved with
purchase decisions.76 Thus, customers will search less externally
and think less internally.77 But, the value of a brand to customers
is not limited to its ability to limit search costs or to impart in-
formation to customers concerning the functional qualities of a
service or product.
that are known for the quality of their products and services, their integrity and the
transparency of their actions are the ones best placed to sustain a competitive advan-
tage.").
71. See Dilbary, supra note 13, at 622-23.
72. See id. at 608.
73. See Brown, supra note 12, at 1183.
74. See id. at 1177.
75. See KELLER, supra note 11, at 53-58 (discussing the impact of brands in periods of
crisis and Tylenol's rebound from a tampering scandal).
76. See Dilbary, supra note 13, at 620.
77. See KELLER, supra note 11, at 7.
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A strong brand provides value independent of signaling func-
tional properties; it has an added psychological dimension.78
These psychological or emotional responses to a brand, in some
cases, can be more important than the physical response to the
actual product. Coca-Cola's ill-fated 1985 attempt to introduce a
new Coke formulation illustrates this phenomenon. 9 In response
to a popular Pepsi advertising campaign, ° Coca-Cola decided to
change its product formulation to match the sweeter Pepsi taste.
This effort proved disastrous and led to a revolt by Coca-Cola's
core customers. Here, Coca-Cola failed to view its brand in its en-
tirety and disregarded the psychological, emotional, and rela-
tional associations customers had with the product.8 '
Another illustration of the psychological impact of brands is the
purchase of groceries from Whole Foods. Whole Foods arguably
provides a healthier product than standard grocery stores with its
organic and preservative-free produce. But, other grocery stores
have created organic food sections to compete with Whole Foods
and more will follow. Yet, Whole Foods' customers will not mi-
grate to standard grocery stores because of the intangible psycho-
logical aspects of the brand. A purchase from Whole Foods con-
tinues to have a completely different psychological impact than a
purchase from a standard regional or national grocery store. The
Whole Foods experience gives the purchaser greater psychological
well-being-reinforcing one's sense of health, environmental, and
social consciousness.8 2
The purchase of a hybrid automobile is another illustration of
branding's psychological impact. For many purchasers, the hybrid
purchase is not simply about fuel efficiency and reducing costs.
Instead, it is about conserving the environment, reinforcing one's
environmental credentials, and eradicating a sense of "green
guilt," the idea that one is not making an adequate sacrifice to
78. See Dilbary, supra note 13, at 608.
79. See KELLER, supra note 11, at 5-6 (citing Patricia Winters, For New Coke, "What
Price Success?" ADVERTISING AGE, Mar. 20, 1989, at S-1 to S-2).
80. Pepsi's popular commercials showed blind taste tests, where unsurprisingly con-
sumers demonstrated a strong preference for Pepsi. See id. at 6. Coke even conducted its
own tests of the new formulation on 190,000 consumers who preferred the new formula-
tion to the old. Id.
81. See id.
82. Similarly, a diamond ring in a Tiffany & Co. blue box has a different psychological
impact than a similar ring from JC Penney.
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preserve the natural environment for future generations.3 In-
deed, psychological pleasure and satisfaction are a part of the
brand experience. Purchase decisions can be an emotive response.
For example, the purchase of perfume or cologne may evoke feel-
ings of romance. Thorstein Veblen acknowledged that consumer
behavior is not always rational, but influenced by a need for pe-
cuniary emulation. 4 The value of a brand may also stem from
how others (i.e., non-users) perceive the good.
One of the most important psychological impacts brands have
is the creation of security and peace of mind for purchasers. Cus-
tomers and brands may share a bond or "implicit understanding"
whereby, in exchange for the consumer's loyalty, the brand will
behave a certain way and provide "utility through consistent
product performance." 5 In this sense, brands protect the cus-
tomer's ex ante expectations concerning the service. 6 This situa-
tion resembles the concept of credible commitment in the incorpo-
ration context. The above examples highlight the importance of
intangible branding effects and how consumers willingly pay a
hefty premium for goods that perhaps have more tangible points
of parity than points of differentiation. 7
The psychological impacts of brands lead some commentators
to question their actual value:
The [neoclassical] economist, whose dour lexicon defines as irrational
any market behavior not dictated by a logical pecuniary calculus,
may think it irrational to buy illusions; but there is a degree of that
kind of irrationality even in economic man; and consuming man is
full of it.
83. Similarly, the purchase of a luxury automobile (e.g., Mercedes Benz) may reinforce
feelings of lavishness, refinement, and success to consumers and others. See Mercedes-
Benz Advertisement, TRAVEL & LEISURE, July 2007 ("I love this car. But I love what it
stands for even more.") (back cover) (on file with author).
84. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 68-69 (Random
House 1934) (1899) (articulating the concept of conspicuous consumption).
85. KELLER, supra note 11, at 8.
86. See Dilbary, supra note 13, at 608.
87. Kevin Keller asserts that "[ploints of difference are those associations that are
unique to the brand that are also strongly held and favorably evaluated by consumers."
KELLER, supra note 11, at 116. Alternatively, "[ploints of parity, on the other hand, are
those associations that are not necessarily unique to the brand but may in fact be shared
with other brands." Id. at 117.
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The taint of irrationality may be dispelled by asserting flatly that
the utility of a good, that is, its capacity to satisfy wants, is meas-
ured exactly by what people will pay for it. If, as is undeniably the
case, consumers will pay more for an advertised brand than for its
unheralded duplicate, then consumers must get more satisfaction
out of the advertised brand.
88
The overarching question of whether a brand has a positive or
negative impact on customer utility is often a matter of perspec-
tive. Yet, one potential metric, although not dispositive, would be
the ratio of tangible brand attributes to intangible ones. Thus, a
high ratio of intangibles could suggest limited customer utility.
3. Delaware
Similar to a popular brand in product or service markets, Dela-
ware's brand allows it to secure profits (e.g., franchise taxes and
attorney's fees), secure future demand, and withstand periods of
turbulence. In addition to being perceived as business friendly,
the Delaware brand has other key associations, such as judicial
integrity and competence; the understanding of corporate com-
plexity; flexibility; and apolitical decision making. For Delaware
and its government actors, there is a need to preserve these core
associations in order to maintain the strength of the Delaware
brand. As with most strong brands, the Delaware brand blends
tangible and intangible elements. Delaware's legal regime is akin
to an experience or credence good (e.g., certain medical treat-
ments) whose actual benefits are difficult to ascertain objectively
through visual inspection and sometimes even through experi-
ence. 9 Under such circumstances, jurisdictional brands become a
significant factor in the firm decision-making process. In addition,
the Delaware brand makes incorporating firms feel more secure
than other jurisdictions. This security is the belief that the Dela-
ware legal regime and its various actors will continue to meet the
ever-changing needs of the business community in a non-
politicized manner. Here, the feeling of security or peace of mind
is an important attribute of Delaware's service even where it is
not directly related to a tangible characteristic or rationale.9 °
88. Brown, supra note 12, at 1181.
89. Also, to the extent the incorporation decision is a purchase of services, assessing
quality is more difficult given the greater variability across this category.
90. See Dilbary, supra note 13, at 608, 621-23.
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Incorporating firms may even choose Delaware based upon
perceptions held by third parties. For example, firms incorporate
in Delaware usually as a result of an IPO or expansion via
merger or acquisition. Given this context, a firm's Delaware in-
corporation communicates to equity markets that the firm has
major league growth ambitions.91 Empirical studies show Dela-
ware incorporation may create a "Delaware effect," i.e., an in-
crease in share price.92 Admittedly, given the sophistication of
firms making incorporation decisions, it is reasonable to question
whether the psychological impact of the Delaware brand is size-
able. But, whether the Delaware brand is more firmly rooted in
performance-related factors or non-product-related ones, it re-
mains a powerful decision-making heuristic that corporate man-
agers use as a risk reduction strategy.
III. COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE IN THE STATE
COMPETITION CONTEXT
In order to compete in product or service markets, firms per-
form a range of activities that create buyer value.9" These activi-
ties are the building blocks of competitive advantage, which is es-
sential to sustaining above average firm performance in competi-
tive markets. Dominant firms, competitors, and buyers are the
key players in the competitive advantage story. In the market for
corporate charters, Delaware acts as a dominant firm, other
states are the competitors, publicly traded corporations are the
buyers, and the incorporation decision is the purchase of a legal
regime. The following subsections outline Delaware's competitive
advantage and facets of its brand in greater detail.
91. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1931, 1963 (1991).
92. See Subramanian, supra note 46, at 32-34, 50.
93. See MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING AND SUSTAINING
SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE xvi, 131 (1985) [hereinafter PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE];
see also PORTER, NATIONS, supra note 61, at 40.
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A. Core Aspects of Competitive Advantage
1. Competitive Advantage
Although the existing state charter competition literature ac-
knowledges Delaware's competitive advantage, it fails to ade-
quately explain it. This failure is due in part to the tendency to
overemphasize a small facet of charter competition at the expense
of analyzing Delaware's competitive advantage in the aggregate.
Therefore, before embarking on a more detailed description of
Delaware's competitive advantages, it is necessary to discuss
some core concepts. Competitive advantage is simply an advan-
tage a firm exercises over its competitors. 4 In general, there are
two types of competitive advantage: cost advantage and differen-
tiation advantage.95 A state has a cost advantage if the cumula-
tive cost of performing all value-producing activities is lower than
the analogous costs in rival jurisdictions.96 In short, states with a
cost advantage can produce valuable outputs at a lesser cost than
rival jurisdictions.97 A state has a differentiation advantage when
it provides something unique and valuable to corporations beyond
a low price.9" Although Delaware possesses both types of competi-
tive advantage, this paper will focus on differentiation advan-
tages, which are the primary source of Delaware's preeminence.
2. Differentiation
In order to maintain a competitive advantage, Delaware must
seek forms of differentiation or uniqueness that corporations
94. Delaware is a dominant firm in the market for corporate charters because it exer-
cises significant control over the current supply and perhaps potential sources of market
expansion that make it difficult for rival jurisdictions to imitate the many competitive ad-
vantages Delaware possesses. See Carney, supra note 12, at 718 n.8.
95. See generally PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 93, at 3 (stating that
cost leadership and differentiation are two basic types of competitive advantage). Harvard
Business School professor Michael E. Porter offers a thorough analysis of competitive ad-
vantage in his seminal book. See id. at xv-xvii. This paper extrapolates from his analysis.
His analysis of competitive advantage is not the only possible analysis, but nonetheless it
is very useful for illuminating how competitive advantage operates in the context of state
charter competition.
96. See id. at 97.
97. See, e.g., Romano, State Competition, supra note 45, at 720-23 (providing cost-
based explanations for Delaware's competitive edge).
98. See PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 93, at 120.
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value. In theory, the basic calculation Delaware performs when
differentiating itself is the comparison between the costs of being
unique with the cost of being equal to other rival jurisdictions.
Differentiation allows the state of Delaware to command a pre-
mium price,99 sell more of its product at a given price, and gain
supplemental benefits, such as reputation and greater loyalty
from corporations during seasonal and cyclical downturns. 100 Dif-
ferentiation is a broad concept not limited to tangible characteris-
tics such as quality and performance. Instead, differentiation en-
compasses both tangible value in use and intangible perceived
value. Delaware's position in the chartering market is a result of
both tangible and intangible value to corporations. A key differ-
entiation advantage for Delaware is its brand.
3. Creating Buyer Value Through Tangible and Intangible
Criteria
Corporations utilize two types of criteria when assessing a ju-
risdiction's value: (i) tangible use-related criteria and (ii) intangi-
ble criteria based upon perception. Tangible criteria reflect func-
tional attributes of a jurisdiction, such as institutional factors,
performance characteristics, substantive law, policies, and proce-
dures. Intangible criteria include factors such as reputation,
market share, customer lists, time-in-business, and visibility to
top management.
Delaware creates value for incorporating firms through both
tangible and intangible criteria."01 To achieve adequate differen-
tiation and maintain its competitive advantage, Delaware cannot
rely solely on tangible criteria-it must also use intangible crite-
ria to signal its uniqueness to firms. A firm's incomplete knowl-
edge of jurisdictional value heightens the impact of differentia-
tion and branding."0 2 For this reason, differentiation has the
greatest impact in the IPO context. Some signals of value require
expenditures by the jurisdiction while others reflect goodwill or
99. See Romano, Competition for Corporate Charters, supra note 38, at 845 (asserting
Delaware regularly receives over 15.5% of its revenues from franchise taxes).
100. See PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 93, at 120. Michael Porter uses
the concepts of use criteria and signaling criteria, which are similar to the concepts of tan-
gible and intangible criteria.
101. See discussion infra Part III.B,
102. See PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 93, at 138-39.
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reputation built over time. 10 3 Thus, jurisdictions can signal or
communicate value in an active or passive fashion. The communi-
cation of value, however, does not necessarily cease upon pur-
chase or incorporation. States may work to reinforce firm percep-
tions of value even after purchase. 
10 4
Finally, intangible criteria may or may not relate to tangible
properties of the product or service."10 The value of intangible cri-
teria are not limited to reducing search costs; they may also in-
crease demand for the product or service itself.10 6 Intangible cri-
teria may have a positive psychological impact independent of the
functional attributes of the underlying product or services.10 7 In
short, a combination of tangible criteria and intangible criteria is
ideal for sustaining corporate value and competitive advantage.
4. Sustainability
Sustainability of competitive advantage hinges on the contin-
ued perception of value from firms. The sustainability of differen-
tiation strategy is linked to finding durable sources of uniqueness
that are protected by barriers to imitation from competition.
When it comes to Delaware's differentiation advantages, barriers
to imitation give other state competitors a moving target, or more
accurately, several moving targets.0 ' Overall, there are four sce-
narios that result in sustainable differentiation; they occur when
(i) the state's sources of differentiation involve barriers; (ii) the
state's sources of differentiation are multiple; (iii) the state's
unique activities raise the cost of switching because corporations
often tailor or invest in the jurisdiction to exploit its uniqueness;
and (iv) the state's brand creates an aversion to substitute juris-
dictions. 109
103. See id. at 139.
104. The concept of credible commitment in the state competition literature falls into
this category. See Kamar, supra note 14, at 1935-36; see also discussion infra Part
III.B.2.f.
105. See Dilbary, supra note 13, at 622-23; see also discussion infra Part III.B.2.
106. See Dilbary, supra note 13, at 623.
107. See id. For a discussion of these psychological benefits see discussion supra Part
II.B.2.
108. See PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 93, at 20. Delaware may or
may not choose to preemptively act in response to changing corporate circumstances.
109. Branding effects could also fall into the first two categories. But, branding is a
higher order differentiation advantage and deserves separate treatment.
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B. Sources of Delaware's Differentiation Advantage
Delaware's legal regime is not a commodity, but a branded
product or service. In a competitive market for services, there is a
tendency toward imitation and uniformity; however, innovation
eliminates the threat of absolute uniformity in the market."' The
fact that numerous jurisdictions have replicated Delaware's cor-
porate code, and yet are unable to even begin to challenge Dela-
ware's preeminence suggests at least two things: (i) substantive
law is only one of many factors creating value, both actual and
perceived, for corporations; and (ii) Delaware continues to do a
better job of creating value for the majority of incorporating and
reincorporating firms (irrespective of potential market imperfec-
tions). The following analysis of Delaware's competitive advan-
tage and multiple sources of differentiation explains Delaware's
dominance and consistent demand from incorporating firms. Al-
though the Delaware brand is a distinct differentiation advan-
tage, the following differentiation advantages-tangible and in-
tangible-are elements of the Delaware brand.'
1. Tangible Use-Related Criteria that Create Buyer Value
A jurisdiction's policies, procedures, and institutions are exam-
ples of tangible criteria that create corporate value. Compared to
rival jurisdictions, several of Delaware's internal features are
unique. This does not mean, however, they are sustainable and
cannot be replicated. The following section identifies Delaware's
sources of differentiation, which are attributable to tangible crite-
ria.
a. Advanced and Flexible Corporate Statute
An "advanced" and "flexible" corporate statute is one reason for
Delaware's preeminence." 2 Delaware adopted its first modern
110. See Carney, supra note 12, at 728-29.
111. Branding can also be considered a distinct type of differentiation advantage.
112. See Division of Corporations, Delaware Department of State, About Agency, supra
note 12; see also ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993)
[hereinafter ROMANO, GENIUS]. Professor Romano asserts:
The genius of American corporate law is in its federalist organization. In the
United States, corporate law, which concerns the relation between a firm's
shareholders and managers, is largely a matter for the states. Firms choose
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corporation statute in 1899 and since that time the Delaware leg-
islature has amended the statute hundreds of times.113 In reality,
however, the Delaware Bar Association's Section on General Cor-
poration Law is responsible for revising the General Corporation
Law.1 14 Members of the Section and its subcommittees carefully
study and make suggestions concerning proposed amendments to
the Delaware General Corporation Law. 115 The General Assem-
bly, in most cases, adopts the amendments recommended by the
Section. 116 In this fashion, Delaware's General Corporation Law
is continually amended by the Bar Section on General Corpora-
tion Law and the General Assembly. The "close working relation-
ship" between the Delaware General Assembly and the corporate
bar works to ensure a swift response to corporate needs in the
form of a flexible statute.1 '7 This collaboration also reveals the
their state of incorporation, a statutory domicile that is independent of physi-
cal presence and that can be changed with shareholder approval. The legisla-
tive approach is, in the main, enabling. Corporation codes supply standard
contract terms for corporate governance. These terms function as default pro-
visions in corporate charters that firms can tailor more precisely to their
needs. Firms therefore can particularize their charters under a state code, as
well as seek the state whose code best matches their needs so as to minimize
their cost of doing business.
Id. at 1.
113. Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency,
15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 896 (1990); see also Hamermesh, Policy Foundations, supra note
45, at 1752 (noting the basic content of the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL")
has been virtually unchanged for the past forty years).
114. Demetrios G. Kaouris, Is Delaware Still a Haven for Incorporation?, 20 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 965, 971 (1995).
115. Id. at 971-72. After receiving reports from the subcommittees, the Council of the
Section decides whether to adopt or reject the bill. Id. at 972. If the Council approves the
bill, the bill proceeds to the Executive Committee of the Bar Association and then to Dela-
ware's General Assembly. Id. The Delaware Constitution requires a supermajority vote for
a modification of the Delaware Corporation Code which makes it difficult for outside in-
terests to change the code. Id. at 974-75.
116. Id. at 972. The Delaware General Assembly is composed of roughly twenty-one
senators and forty-one representatives. State of Delaware, Delaware General Assembly,
Legislative Info, Know Your Legislators, http:/legis.delaware.gov/legislature.nsf/Lookup/
Know Your-Leg islators?open&nav+leginfo (last visited Mar. 29, 2008). Since 1966, no
member of the General Assembly has been a corporate lawyer and furthermore only nine
members have been lawyers. See Alva, supra note 113, at 897 n.54. Despite the code's im-
portance, there is not a specific committee within the legislature devoted "largely or exclu-
sively to corporate matters." Id. at 897. For example, amendments to the General Corpora-
tion Law are reviewed by the Judiciary Committee. Id. at 897-98. This absence of
members of Delaware's Corporate Bar from the General Assembly may suggest that its
members lack the knowledge to make informed decisions about Delaware corporate law
and perhaps serves as evidence of the General Assembly's lack of involvement in drafting
the corporate code.
117. See Kaouris, supra note 114, at 973.
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significant degree of private and public interaction in the corpo-
rate lawmaking process."11
As mentioned above, the General Assembly plays a lesser role
in the actual drafting of the General Corporation Law. Instead,
the General Assembly's role is limited to enacting corporate legis-
lation and deferring to recommendations from the corporate bar
and the Division of Corporations.119 Accordingly, most of the de-
bate, amendment, and lobbying with regard to the Delaware
General Corporation Law takes place within the Corporate Law
Section. 20 Here, in-house attorneys, out-of-state Delaware attor-
neys, corporate managers, and corporation service companies
provide input.121 The specialized local bar in Delaware acts as
"protector[ ] and guardian[ I to the statutory law of corpora-
tions."
' 122
Despite the flexibility of the corporate statute, its substance is
not a durable source of competitive advantage because it is easily
duplicated in other states. This has already happened in a num-
ber of states,'23 but states that have adopted similar statutory
provisions are not nearly as successful in enticing corporations as
Delaware.124 Even states that have adopted more management-
friendly statutory provisions (e.g., allowing for stronger anti-
takeover measures) do not rival Delaware. 125 One reason for this
discrepancy is that Delaware's Corporate Bar, an expert group,
has unmatched authority in the corporation law amendment
118. See Hamermesh, Policy Foundations, supra note 45, at 1758-59 (discussing the
"symbiotic and trust-based relationship" between the Delaware Bar and General Assem-
bly). Furthermore, Hamermesh observes that the Delaware Bar leaves parochial client
interests behind when proposing corporate legislation. See id. at 1758.
119. See Kaouris, supra note 114, at 971-72.
120. See id. at 971-75; Alva, supra note 113, at 900-01.
121. See Alva, supra note 113, at 900-01.
122. Allen, supra note 3, at 4.
123. See Carney, supra note 12, at 731-36 (providing a lengthy discussion of uniformity
among state corporate statutes).
124. See Kaouris, supra note 114, at 1004; see also Carney, supra note 12, at 718 (as-
serting Maine and Nevada have tried to compete, but have failed to attract a significant
amount of charters); Cary, supra note 12, at 665-66 (describing attempts by other states
to emulate Delaware's statutory scheme in order to attract corporations).
125. See Ferris, Lawless & Noronha, supra note 26, at 17-18 (acknowledging that de-
spite Delaware's preeminence, it does not have the most management-friendly legal cli-
mate). This study measured states' long-term reputation for adopting statutes that en-
hance managerial power. Surprisingly, Delaware was behind Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Wisconsin, New York, Virginia and Nevada. Id. Therefore, it is not accurate to character-
ize Delaware as overly pro-management.
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process compared to other states. Within this environment,
Delaware's legislature can respond to corporate innovations.
126
Despite the ability to respond, actual changes to the Delaware
General Corporation Law ("DGCL") over the past forty years have
been conservative.'27 This conservatism results in deference to
the judicial branch to incrementally sketch corporate law through
the judicial process. 12' Delaware exhibits a "preference for gen-
eral, nonprescriptive, and nonproscriptive rules." 29 In a sense,
the statutory scheme acts as a "guidepost[ ;.130
b. Case Law and Precedent
Delaware's flexible and responsive corporation statute is but-
tressed by a well developed body of case law. Delaware's Court of
Chancery has over a two hundred-year-history that demonstrates
"the [c]ourt's ability to adapt principles of equity developed centu-
ries ago to ever-changing economic circumstances and legal rela-
tionships."'13' Delaware Court of Chancery and Delaware Su-
preme Court rulings establish precedents which provide greater
predictability, allowing corporations to make planning decisions
with greater confidence. 132 Unlike Delaware's corporate statute,
Delaware's case law and precedents are unique and not easy to
duplicate.
Commentators have correctly observed Delaware's strong pref-
erence that corporate law should be developed through a common
law decision-making process. 133 This preference is particularly
126. See id. at 18 (asserting companies consider not only the content of corporate law,
but also a jurisdiction's reputation for innovation).
127. See Hamermesh, Policy Foundations, supra note 45, at 1772. Lawrence Hamer-
mesh observes:
Looking back over the forty years since the landmark 1967 general revision of
the Delaware General Corporation Law, one of course observes many statu-
tory changes. What appears on further reflection, however, is just how few of
those changes have involved any dramatic effect on the governance of pub-
licly held corporations. Many of the statutory changes have been technical,
and very few have attracted any academic attention.
Id.
128. See id. at 1776-78.
129. Id. at 1779.
130. See Veasey, Aspirations, supra note 51, at 2179.
131. William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court of
Chancery-1 792-1992, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 819-20 (1993).
132. See Kaouris, supra note 114, at 977.
133. See Fisch, supra note 39, at 1075-81; Kahan & Rock, supra note 39, at 1610-11
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apparent in the fiduciary duty area where such duties by nature
are equitable and fact driven.134 At the heart of this preference is
the belief that issues involving "complex facts cannot and should
not be reduced to black letter codification."'35 As a result of the
legislature's preference against regulatory prescription and its
deference to the judicial branch, Delaware courts are often the
first responders to corporate law controversies.136 The dockets of
the Delaware Supreme Court and Court of Chancery are driven
by plaintiffs and not political upswings. Delaware's judge-made
law "reduces the likelihood of a populist challenge to its preemi-
nence."'37 Judge-made law appears more neutral and distanced
from the political process than legislative enactments. Delaware
court decisions-with majority, concurring, and dissenting opin-
ions, along with supporting rationale-arguably deserve greater
respect than pronouncements from other government branches
whose procedures may appear more ad hoc, arbitrary, and less
transparent. 138
Some commentators argue Delaware's case law is indetermi-
nate to bolster the claim that Delaware law lacks qualitative
value. 139 This claim is overstated. 4 ° Instead, indeterminacy in
(characterizing Delaware corporate law as a "throwback" and "determinedly old-
fashioned").
134. See E. Norman Veasey, Shawn Pompian & Christine Di Guglielmo, Federalism vs.
Federalization: Preserving the Division of Responsibility in Corporation Law, THE SEC.
REP., (ABA Section of Bus. Law Comm. on Fed. Regulation on Sec., Chi., Ill.) Fall 2005, at
77, 94.
135. Hamermesh, Policy Foundations, supra note 45, at 1777; see also Kamar, supra
note 14, at 1915; Veasey, Pompian & Di Guglielmo, supra note 134, at 97.
136. See Hamermesh, Policy Foundations, supra note 45, at 1782.
137. Kahan & Rock, supra note 39, at 1612.
138. But see David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83
VA. L. REV. 127, 129-30 (1997) [hereinafter Skeel, The Unanimity Norm] (asserting the
norm for the Delaware Supreme Court is unanimous decisions, which increase the possi-
bility of "cycling" effects).
139. See, e.g., Kamar, supra note 14, at 1939-46 (implicating that interest group pref-
erences account for indeterminacy); Branson, supra note 14, at 112 (asserting pro-
shareholder decisions result from the interest group influence of plaintiff lawyers that
make up the Delaware establishment).
140. Vice Chancellor Leo Strine disagrees with the characterization of Delaware law as
overly indeterminate and inefficient:
Instead, I advance the proposition that much of Delaware corporate law's in-
determinacy and litigation intensiveness is an unavoidable consequence of
the flexibility of the Delaware Model, which leaves room for economically use-
ful innovation and creativity. That is, reducing the indeterminacy of Dela-
ware corporate law by moving closer to the Mandatory Statutory Model
might also impair its central emphasis on corporate empowerment and pri-
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Delaware law reflects the complexity of modern corporations and
the "ongoing struggle to apply the law and concurrently do eq-
uity."1 41 Delaware corporate law cannot be labeled under a uni-
tary value, such as efficiency or fairness. It embodies a range of
competing values that may appear inconsistent depending upon
context. Former Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey astutely ob-
serves, "The Delaware courts decide so many important cases
that there is bound to be room for academic and practitioner
praise, criticism, and sometimes uncertainty."' The Delaware
courts' attempts to address the above-mentioned complexity is re-
flected in the business judgment rule and fiduciary duty juris-
prudence.
vate ordering, to the detriment of social welfare.
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware's Corporate-Law System: Is Corporate America Buying an Ex-
quisite Jewel or a Diamond in the Rough? A Response to Kahan & Kamar's Price Discrimi-
nation in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1259 (2001) [hereinaf-
ter Strine, Exquisite Jewel]; see also Fisch, supra note 39, at 1083-85 (asserting
indeterminacy has benefits as well as costs); Romano, Law as a Product, supra note 20, at
274 (asserting the majority of managers, in-house counsel, outside counsel, and others sur-
veyed prefer Delaware re-incorporation partly for case law and precedent). In addition,
some scholars assert that Delaware case law vacillates back and forth in response to vari-
ous interest groups and scandal. See, e.g., Branson, supra note 14, at 111-12; Griffith, su-
pra note 47, at 58-68. Former Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey provides the following al-
ternative explanation for movements in Delaware law:
Our courts do not have a political agenda that vacillates from time to time to
favor one litigant over the other. Delaware courts today are not any more
"pro-stockholder" and less "pro-director" than they were in the past, or vice
versa. The expectations of director conduct have evolved over the years, in-
cluding in the post-Enron era, but that does not mean the courts have begun
to take on a political agenda to favor stockholders over directors. That evolu-
tion in director expectations is a function of the development of the common
law reflecting changing business mores and sharper pleading in corporate
litigation, focusing more precisely on process. Delaware courts are balanced
and objective, and the business judgment rule is alive and well.
Veasey, Center of Universe, supra note 12, at 169.
141. Hamermesh, Policy Foundations, supra note 45, at 1762; see also Leo E. Strine,
Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges We
(and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 683 (2005) [hereinafter Strine, Delaware Way].
Vice Chancellor Strine asserts:
[E]quitable review is situationally-specific and proceeds in the common law
fashion. The case at hand is decided and the law is thereby evolved incremen-
tally. Although that can lead to what some scholars like to call indetermi-
nancy [sic]-i.e., some residual uncertainty-it also allows space for the judi-
ciary to pull back in future cases if a prior decision turns out, in the wake of
experience, to have been unwise.
Id. (emphasis added).
142. Veasey, Center of Universe, supra note 12, at 170.
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i. The Business Judgment Rule
The touchstone of Delaware corporate law is the business
judgment rule, which promotes corporate efficiency. Under Dela-
ware law, there is the presumption that directors have acted in-
dependently, on an informed basis, in good faith, and with an
honest belief that their decision is in the best interests of the cor-
poration.143 This presumption can be rebutted if the process, in-
dependence, or good faith of directors is compromised; or the deci-
sion cannot be attributed to a rational business purpose.
Delaware law provides directors with considerable discretion to
manage the affairs of the corporation. This discretion, however, is
not unfettered. This discretion is pragmatic because it allows for
inter-temporal business planning (i.e., short term vs. long term)
and can accommodate failing corporate strategies as well as ex-
tensive philanthropic endeavors. 144
ii. Common Law Fiduciary Duties
Delaware common law fiduciary duties (i.e., loyalty and care)
reflect an attempt to balance corporate efficiency with equitable
principles. These common law standards are malleable, allowing
Delaware courts to engage in a mild form of contextualism.145 A
143. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). Robert Clark describes the
business judgment rule as follows:
The rule is simply that the business judgment of the directors will not be
challenged or overturned by courts or shareholders, and the directors will not
be held liable for the consequences of their exercise of business judgment-
even for judgments that appear to have been clear mistakes-unless certain
exceptions apply.
ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.4 (1986); see also FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ,
CORPORATION LAW 278-79 (2000) ("The idea underlying the rule is that courts should ex-
ercise restraint in holding directors liable for (or otherwise second guessing) business deci-
sions which produce poor results or with which reasonable minds might disagree. This
seems to be a sensible notion. After all, business decisions typically involve taking calcu-
lated risks.").
144. See generally Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest,
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005) (arguing corporate social responsibility initiatives are per-
mitted pursuant to the broad discretion under Delaware law).
145. Delaware courts resolve cases across a range of factual contexts and are not con-
strained by bright-line rules. See Veasey, Defining Tension, supra note 48, at 393-94 (dis-
cussing the types of decisions Delaware courts review, such as enterprise, ownership, and
oversight); see also E. Norman Veasey, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and
Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA L.
REV. 1399 (2005) [hereinafter Veasey, What Happened] (discussing the wide range of cor-
porate cases heard by Delaware courts). Generally, Delaware fiduciary duty law addresses
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recent example of this approach can be found in the Delaware
Supreme Court's decision in Stone v. Ritter, which addressed the
issue of director oversight responsibility for corporate legal com-
pliance. 146 Firm legal compliance decisions, unlike other types of
board decisions, have a strong operational component and involve
a litany of decisions made by various employees throughout a
firm. For this reason, director oversight of corporate legal compli-
ance cannot be evaluated effectively through a rigid formulaic or
mandatory approach. Delaware's contextualized standards-based
approach to director oversight of corporate legal compliance is a
sharp contrast from the mandatory prescriptive rule-based ap-
proach under Sarbanes-Oxley ("SOX"). 147 At first glance, SOX's
prescriptive rules appear more stringent than Delaware common
law standards addressing director oversight responsibility for
corporate legal compliance. Although SOX establishes certain re-
quirements for directors, it "fails to impose any legal sanctions on
directors who do not comply with their responsibilities under the
Act."1 4 Meanwhile, under Delaware law, the threshold of liability
for directors is extremely high, yet the prospect of personal liabil-
ity is real.149 To provide a simple illustration, directors could ig-
three categories of decisions: enterprise, ownership, and oversight. Veasey, Defining Ten-
sion, supra note 48, at 394. Enterprise decisions are standard decisions made by manage-
ment, such as the decision to build a foreign production plant or what products to produce.
See id. Ownership decisions surround ownership changes such as mergers, acquisitions
and corporate takeovers. See id. Oversight decisions concern managers' monitoring role,
such as ensuring employees execute their responsibilities in compliance with law. See id.
146. 911 A.2d 362, 364 (Del. 2006). In Stone, plaintiff shareholders filed a derivative
suit alleging that fifteen directors and former directors of AmSouth breached their fiduci-
ary duty of oversight resulting in $50 million in fines and civil penalties for AmSouth. Id.
at 364-65. The actual penalties stemmed from the failure of bank employees to file man-
datory reports in compliance with federal regulations. Id. at 365. Ultimately, the Delaware
Supreme Court upheld the decision of In re Caremark Int'l Inc., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch.
1996) en route to affirming the Chancery Court's decision to dismiss the complaint. Id. at
369-73. Despite upholding the dismissal of the underlying complaint, the court's decision
in Stone does more than simply pay lip-service to the prospect of director liability.
147. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. V 2000). The prescriptive bright-line rules
under SOX have been criticized for failing to differentiate between larger and smaller
firms. See Veasey, Pompian & Di Guglielmo, supra note 134, at 77, 94-95 (highlighting
the one-size-fits-all shortcoming of SOX reforms); see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod,
Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors' Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42
Hous. L. REv. 393, 395-96 (2005) (asserting the necessity for director liability in the over-
sight area citing limitations of state and federal corporate law); Roberta Romano, The Sar-
banes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521,
1527-29 (2005) (explaining SOX's shortcomings as a product of crisis-mode legislation).
148. Fairfax, supra note 147 at 406.
149. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 372; Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967.
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nore clear violations of environmental law or red flags and fail to
implement measures in light of these clear risks, thus violating
their good faith obligations and duty of loyalty under Delaware
law. Such conduct could give rise to personal director liability un-
der Delaware law, but not necessarily under SOX. Under Stone,
directors may be liable for an utter failure to implement legal
compliance systems across a wide array of legal categories (e.g.,
anti-corruption, government procurement, and environmental) or
ignoring red flags signaling significant risks. Decisions like Stone
and the emerging good faith jurisprudence under Delaware law
illustrate that Delaware courts are not indifferent to equity inter-
ests. 
150
c. The Specialized and Proficient Court System
Delaware's court system features a separate equity court from
which appeals go directly to the Delaware Supreme Court.15' The
Court of Chancery's jurisdiction is limited largely to business
matters, such as contracts, fiduciary duties, trusts and estates,
and corporate law matters.152 The Court of Chancery has a na-
tional reputation for its sophistication and expertise in handling
corporate cases.'53 The special attributes of the Court of Chan-
cery's adjudication are its speed and expertise, which require ex-
perience."5 In a sense, the Chancery Court functions as a quasi-
arbitrator, whose services are purchased via Delaware incorpora-
tion. 155 As former Chancellor William T. Allen asserts, "It is not
150. See Sarah Helene Duggin & Stephen M. Goldman, Restoring Trust in Corporate
Directors: The Disney Standard and the "New" Good Faith, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 211, 248-49
(2006) (asserting the Disney jurisprudence established a new standard of good faith to ad-
dress culpable actions); see also Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del.
1971) (highlighting the importance of equity); ATR-Kim Eng. Fin. Corp. v. Araneta, No.
489-N, Del. Ch. 2006 LEXIS 215, at *70-71 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006) (finding directors li-
able for breaching their duty of loyalty by failing to implement any monitoring system as
required by Stone and Caremark); see also Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004) (discussing the evolution of Delaware's standard of good faith
as applied to management).
151. Delaware is one of three states that continue to have a division between law and
equity. See Alva, supra note 113, at 902-03. Approximately 70% of the cases before the
Delaware Court of Chancery are corporate matters. This steady flow of cases enhances ju-
dicial quality and experience. See Kamar, supra note 14, at 1926 n.68.
152. See Allen, supra note 3, at 4.
153. See Kaouris, supra note 114, at 975.
154. See Allen, supra note 3, at 4.
155. See Roe, Delaware's Politics, supra note 39 at 2501 ("Hence, one could say that in-
vestors and managers make Delaware corporate law and that they then bring in the
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unusual for the validity of a hugely complex corporate decision to
be determined in Chancery within 60 days . . 156 Moreover,
"[flew if any courts can match the speed and intensity" of the
Court of Chancery in adjudicating corporate matters. 157 Delaware
has one chancellor and four vice chancellors who sit individually
without juries.15 The chancellors and vice chancellors are ap-
pointed by the governor and confirmed by the senate for a period
of twelve years.'59 Although most Court of Chancery decisions do
not receive appellate review, the Delaware Supreme Court plays
a key role by swiftly handling Court of Chancery appeals and
rendering influential decisions. There are five Delaware Supreme
Court justices-one chief justice and four associate justices. 160
Similar to the Court of Chancery, Delaware Supreme Court jus-
tices are appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the state
senate for twelve-year terms. 16 ' The Delaware State Constitution
mandates a political balance or bipartisan judiciary. 16' As a re-
sult, "[t]hree of the justices must represent one of the major po-
litical parties while the other two justices must be members of the
Delaware judges-selected by bar committees-to arbitrate their disputes.").
156. Allen, supra note 3, at 4. Former Chancellor Allen also cites the merger of Time
and Warner Communications as his most vivid memory of the court's speed and intensity.
Allen notes:
[Aifter after about six or eight weeks of feverish discovery and briefing, I had
only five or six days to write what turned out to be a lengthy and complex
opinion. The appeal of my decision was determined in less than a month and
a multi-billion dollar transaction could move forward with much less legal
risk.
Id. Speed is also an attribute of the Delaware Supreme Court. For example, in 2005 the
average time from submission to disposition was 39.6 days. See First State Judiciary, 2005
Annual Report and Statistical Information for the Delaware Judiciary, http://courts.dela
ware.gov/AOC/Annual%20Reports/FY05/Supreme/Supreme%20AR05-web.htm. Further-
more, Delaware Supreme Court Internal Operating Procedures impose a ninety-day final
opinion deadline following submission. See DEL. SUP. CT. INTERNAL OPERATING P. x(3),
available at http://courts.Delaware.gov/Rules/?iops.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2008). Parties
may also request an expedited disposition.
157. See Allen, supra note 3, at 4.
158. Delaware Judicial Information Center, First State Judiciary-Court of Chancery
Judges, http://courts.delaware.gov/Courts/Court%20of%20Chancery/?jud_ off.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 29, 2008).
159. Id.
160. Delaware Judicial Information Center, First State Judiciary-Delaware Supreme
Court Justices, http://courts.delaware.gov/Courts/Supreme%20Court/?justices.htm (last
visited Mar. 29, 2008).
161. Id. These twelve-year terms are often renewed.
162. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3; see also Veasey, Center of Universe, supra note 12, at
166-67.
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other major political party."163 For over twenty-five years, Dela-
ware's governor has selected judges from a list of candidates
screened by a bipartisan Judicial Nominating Commission.
164
Unlike other states where corporate cases are heard by numerous
judges in courts of general jurisdiction, Delaware limits corporate
litigation to two courts and ten judges. Some commentators con-
tend this creates greater stability and predictability. 165 Arguably,
Delaware judges have even more legitimacy than federal judges
due to their experience and developed corporate expertise.
16
Delaware's proficient court system is an enduring form of com-
petitive advantage, which is extremely difficult to replicate. Even
before a state can develop a specialized court system with experi-
enced and highly skilled judges,'67 the state must have a signifi-
163. Delaware Judicial Information Center, First State Judiciary-Delaware Supreme
Court Justices, supra note 160. The Court of Chancery maintains a similar political bal-
ance. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
164. See Veasey, Center of Universe, supra note 12, at 166-67. As a result, corporations
do not contribute to judicial campaigns in Delaware.
165. See Kaouris, supra note 114, at 977. Former Chancellor Allen asserts "[t]he pres-
ence of a large body of work from a relative small body of judges greatly facilitates the
process of interpretation and prediction." Allen, supra note 3, at 4; see also ROMANO,
GENIUS, supra note 112, at 40.
166. Kahan & Rock, supra note 39, at 1612. Whether corporate decisions are made by
Delaware or federal judges, however, may be of little importance.
167. Delaware Supreme Court and Chancery Court judges have significant expertise
and experience. For the biographies of current Chancery Court judges, see Delaware Judi-
cial Information Center, First State Judiciary-Court of Chancery Judges, supra note 158.
Delaware Chancery judges tend to have a wealth of experience before being appointed to
the Chancery. Chancellor Chandler served as Vice Chancellor for eight years before being
appointed Chancellor. Id. Vice-Chancellor Strine served as counsel to Governor Thomas
Carper for five years before being appointed. Vice Chancellor Lamb served as a Special
Counsel in the Office of General Counsel at the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"). Id. Most of the Chancery judges also practiced at prominent Delaware law firms.
See id.
Delaware Supreme Court Justices also have extensive experience. For biographies of
current Delaware Supreme Court Justices, see Delaware Judicial Information Center,
First State Judiciary-Delaware Supreme Court Justices, supra note 160. Chief Justice
Myron Steele was a resident judge of the Delaware Superior Court for four years, a Vice
Chancellor for six years, and a Delaware Supreme Court Justice for four years before be-
ing appointed Chief Justice. Id. Justice Berger served as Vice Chancellor for ten years.
Justice Jacobs served as Vice Chancellor for eighteen years. Justice Ridgely served as a
trial judge on the superior court for twenty years. Id. Justice Holland has served on the
Supreme Court for twenty-two years. Id. In 1986, he became the youngest person ever ap-
pointed to the Delaware Supreme Court. Id. Many of the justices have also written books,
articles, taught as adjunct professors, and worked at prominent Delaware law firms. See
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cant number of corporate franchises and cases 6 ' to create oppor-
tunities to build a body of jurisprudence.169
d. The Service-Oriented Division of Corporations
The Division of Corporations is often overlooked as a factor
contributing to Delaware's success in the charter market. The Di-
vision of Corporations, which falls under the office of the Secre-
tary of State, offers valuable professional assistance to corpora-
tions. Swift and accommodating service may be necessary in
closing corporate transactions. In response to this reality, the Di-
vision of Corporations offers expedited services, such as providing
speedy processing for corporate filings. For example, companies
can incorporate within as little as one, two, or twenty-four
hours.17 ° Moreover, backlogs are almost nonexistent. Handling
such a large volume of filings over the years has led to the effi-
cient use of institutional apparatus and technology to improve the
Division's services.17' The Division of Corporations takes a busi-
ness-like approach, as opposed to a bureaucratic one, by market-
ing itself and the State of Delaware as a business-friendly juris-
diction. 172
e. An Interested and Specialized Bar
Members of Delaware's corporate bar operate as specialized lo-
cal experts. The hiring of Delaware lawyers by corporations or
other large New York law firms is a quality and cost-saving
measure. With specialized expertise and experience, Delaware
168. See Kaouris, supra note 114, at 1004-05. Furthermore, "[elven in large states,
such as California, New York, and Texas, where corporate lawyers abound and where
there is a wealth of legal precedent, the states have not created court systems which can
handle complex corporate matters quickly and efficiently." Id.
169. See generally DELAWARE SUPREME COURT: GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY 1951-2001, at
81-131 (Randy J. Holland & Helen L. Winslow eds., 2001) (discussing the corporate law
jurisprudence in Delaware); Delaware Department of State, Division of Corporations, Fre-
quently Asked Questions, http://www.corp.delaware.gov/faqs.shtml (last visited Mar. 29,
2008).
170. See generally Delaware Department of State, Division of Corporations, Frequently
Asked Questions, supra note 169.
171. See William J. Reif, Delaware Service, CORP. EDGE, (Div. of Corp., Dover, Del.),
Summer 1996, at 4, 4 (on file with author).
172. An example of this approach to marketing was the publication of The Corporate
Edge Newsletter. The Corporate Edge was published by the Delaware Department of State.
See, e.g., CORP. EDGE (Div. of Corp., Dover, Del.), Spring 2001 (on file with author).
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corporate lawyers increase the certainty of corporate planning.
This assertion seems even more credible when one considers the
critical role the corporate bar plays in drafting and amending the
General Corporation Law. 173 Also, it is less expensive for corpora-
tions and New York firms to hire a smaller specialized firm that
will assign a limited number of associates or a partner to tackle
what for them is a routine task. For example, in the corporate
takeover context, because so many target corporations are domi-
ciled in Delaware, targets and acquirers alike retain local Dela-
ware counsel to advise them on a particular legal issue or to par-
ticipate in the fast-paced litigation of the Delaware court system.
Moreover, as a consequence of institutional alignment, out-of-
state litigants may have an incentive to retain local counsel, who
have developed a rapport and familiarity with the ten judges who
hear corporate cases.174 The Delaware corporate bar is a close-
knit group exemplifying civility. Preserving one's reputation is
extremely important among this small group. When corporations
enlist the aid of smaller Delaware firms, they are receiving or, at
a minimum, perceiving, an insider advantage."17
f. Institutional Alignment and Stable Political Climate
Institutional alignment and a stable political climate contrib-
ute to Delaware's competitive advantage. The relationship be-
tween the Delaware corporate bar, the General Assembly, the Di-
vision of Corporations, and the judiciary is best described as
symbiotic.176 There is a significant amount of "collegial interac-
173. See Macey & Miller, supra note 47, at 506-09 (identifying Delaware's corporate
bar as the premiere interest group shaping Delaware corporate law).
174. See Skeel, The Unanimity Norm, supra note 138, at 160-61. Skeel asserts that
"lilt usually pays to retain a lawyer who knows, and is known and respected by, the su-
preme court." Id.
175. Delaware's largest corporate law firms have an impressive list of corporate clients.
See, e.g., Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP: Representative Clients, http://potterander
son.comabout-matters.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2008); Morris Nichols: Representative
Clients, http://www.mnat.comfirm-clients.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2008). Skadden,
Arps, a major Wall Street law firm, has established a branch office in Wilmington, DE.
Skadden lawyers often litigate cases in the Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme
Court. See Wilmington Nature of Practice-Skadden, Arps, http://www.skadden.com/In
dex.cfm?contentID=49&officeID=22 (last visited Mar. 29, 2008).
176. See Kamar, supra note 14, at 1940; see also E. Norman Veasey, "I Have the Best
Job in America," DEL. LAW., Winter 1995, at 20, 23 [hereinafter Veasey, Best Job] (assert-
ing that the Delaware Supreme Court has "excellent relations with the other two branches
of state government"). E. Norman Veasey, the former Chief Justice of the Delaware Su-
preme Court, comments on Delaware's cooperative atmosphere:
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tion" between influential groups in Delaware, such as the rela-
tionship between Delaware's judiciary and the local bar, as well
as the above-mentioned deference the General Assembly gives to
the corporate bar.'77
Delaware does not have many legislative pressures to disrupt
the development of law. There is a lack of pressure from interest
groups such as unions, environmental groups, institutional
shareholders, and local communities."7 ' If Delaware is associated
with any particular industries or products, it is most likely
chemicals, credit cards, and corporate law. Historically, compa-
nies such as DuPont and MBNA were top employers in the state
of Delaware. 7 9 These companies have played a paternalistic role
by providing economic security to employees and having a signifi-
cant philanthropic presence in Delaware communities.' ° As a
consequence, the security of many Delaware residents is often
tied to the success of companies having significant operations
within the state. Therefore, the absence of cogs in the wheels of
Delaware's size as the "small wonder" gives us an enormous advantage, par-
ticularly when coupled with the intelligence, approachability, cooperation and
integrity of our public office holders. All three branches of government in
Delaware are keenly aware of the reputation of the judicial branch of gov-
ernment and of the enormous contribution that the judicial branch makes to
Delaware's economy and to the well-being of our citizens. Delaware's judicial
branch must, however, continuously explain and justify its processes to the
other two branches and to the citizenry. We are making that effort. But, we
need the help of the organized Bar, and we need for the other two branches of
government to examine, advise, hear and support us.
Id. at 22.
177. See Skeel, The Unanimity Norm, supra note 138, at 160. William Cary viewed
such interaction as problematic. See Cary, supra note 12, at 687-88.
178. Reincorporating in Delaware does not result in a significant loss of local employ-
ment, which is the case in other states. See Carney, supra note 12, at 719. Rarely is Dela-
ware the principal place of business.
179. DuPont and MBNA have been the two largest private employers in Delaware over
the last decade. In 1997, they combined to employ 23,850 residents, or 6.52% of Delaware's
entire workforce. See COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 38, at 142.
The next largest employer employed 5,500 workers. Id. In 2006, following Bank of Amer-
ica's purchase of MBNA, DuPont and Bank of America combined to employ 17,986 work-
ers, or 4.06% of Delaware's entire workforce. The next largest employer employed only
7,289 workers. Id.
180. See, e.g., Access Philanthropy-MBNA Foundation, http://accessphilanthropy.
comlfunderinnews.php?funderlD=307 (last visited Mar. 29, 2008) (describing the MBNA
Foundation and its goals to promote education, human services, and the arts in Delaware
and other communities). After Bank of America purchased MBNA, the MBNA Foundation
became part of their charitable program. See Press Release, Bank of America, Bank of
America Completes MBNA Merger (Jan. 1, 2006), http://newsroom.bankofamerica.com
/index.php?s=press-releases&item=7245.
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Delaware's legislative and judicial system limits business uncer-
tainty and increases Delaware's overall responsiveness to busi-
ness needs, reducing the amount of bureaucratic failure.
The political climate in Delaware is mildly conservative and
"marked by high respect for incumbency and a distrust of violent
swings."1"1 The longstanding political careers of Thomas Carper,
Joseph Biden, William Roth, and Michael Castle are a testament
to the Delawarean preference for stability.' 2 Similar values affect
the development of corporate law.8 3 Predictability and continuity
are values both investors and management desire. Two events in
the development of Delaware corporate law demonstrate the en-
during presence of these values: (i) the wave of takeover statutes
enacted in the late 1980s; and (ii) the monumental Smith v. Van
Gorkom ls4 decision and its aftermath. In the former scenario, the
Delaware legislature passed one of the most moderate takeover
statutes in the nation when other states had already passed more
restrictive laws.8 5 In the latter scenario, the Delaware Supreme
Court overturned a Chancery Court decision to find a corporate
181. Allen, supra note 3, at 3.
182. These politicians have served the state of Delaware in an array of political capaci-
ties over the past half-century. The sum of their time in political office exceeds 117 years.
For the biographical information of Thomas Carper, Joseph R. Biden, William Roth, and
Michael Castle see Congressional Biographical Directory, http://bioguide.congress.gov/bio
search/biosearch.asp (last visited Mar. 29, 2008). Delaware's preference for incumbency
and political stability can be seen from the number of politicians who are re-elected to the
same or different representative positions. For example, Joseph Biden has served in the
United States Senate from 1972 to the present. Biden-Biographical Information, http://bio
guide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=B000444 (last visited Mar. 29, 2008). Mi-
chael Castle served as Deputy Attorney General of Delaware for two years, as a represen-
tative to the Delaware House of Representatives for two years, as a Delaware state sena-
tor for eight years, as Lieutenant Governor of Delaware for four years, as Governor for
eight years, and as a member of the United States House of Representatives from 1993 to
the present. Castle-Biographical Information, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodis
play.pl?index=C000243 (last visited Mar. 29, 2008). Tom Carper served as the Delaware
State Treasurer for eight years, as a member of the United States House of Representa-
tives for ten years, as Governor of Delaware for eight years, and as a United States Sena-
tor from 2001 to the present. Carper-Biographical Information, http://bioguide.congress.
gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=C000174 (last visited Mar. 29, 2008). Prior to his death in
2003, William Roth served as a representative to the United States House of Representa-
tives for three years and as a senator in the United States Senate for thirty years. Roth-
Biographical Information, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=RO004
60 (last visited Mar. 29, 2008).
183. See Romano, Competition for Corporate Charters, supra note 38, at 855-56 (de-
scribing Delaware's hesitance to adopt takeover legislation).
184. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
185. See Romano, Competition for Corporate Charters, supra note 38, at 855.
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board personally liable for breaching their duty of care. 18 6 In re-
sponse to the Van Gorkom decision, the Delaware legislature
passed section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation
Law, which allows shareholders to approve charter amendments
waiving director liability for inattention.187 Delaware's mildly
conservative political climate favoring stability and institutional
alignment is an enduring source of value for corporations.
g. Network Externalities
Wide use of Delaware law ensures it will be used in the future
due to the "network and learning externalities that accrue to
firms incorporated in the state."' An example of a positive net-
work externality would be the use of Microsoft operating systems
that continue to command significant market share (irrespective
of product superiority) due to existing or already pre-existing
wide use. Likewise, the more widely Delaware corporate law is
used, the more valuable it becomes to each corporation. When
firms are subject to the same legal benchmarks, this increases
predictability in judicial decision making. Legal uniformity
among corporation also "facilitates securities pricing by making
comparisons with other securities on the market easier.""8 9 Firms
value legal uniformity and predictability. Aside from existing
wide use, Delaware's position is also the result of past use that
led to the development of comprehensive case law and quality le-
gal services. 9 ° Ehud Kamar describes these effects as "learning
externalities" because they do not depend on the extent of current
use.191 In sum, existing wide use and extensive past use of Dela-
ware law is valuable to corporations.
The foregoing examples illustrate the significant role tangible
criteria play in attracting incorporating firms. Delaware has one
186. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d, at 893. In Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court held
that the directors of Trans Union Corporation breached their duty to make an informed
decision about a proposed merger and as a result found the directors personally liable for
damages. Id.
187. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001); Allen, supra note 3, at 3.
188. Kamar, supra note 14, at 1923. Here, Ehud Kamar uses the telephone as an ex-
ample whereby the more extensive the telephone network is, the higher the value becomes
for each user. See id.
189. Id. at 1924.
190. See id.
191. See id.
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group largely responsible for drafting amendments to the corpo-
rate code, only ten judges hearing corporate cases, and one execu-
tive office participating in corporate matters by rapidly process-
ing corporate filings. These tangible use-related factors make
Delaware more attractive to corporations by providing a stable
basis for corporate planning and efficiency. 192 Most of the tangible
differentiation advantages enumerated herein-with the excep-
tion of the judiciary, case law, and political climate-are prone to
replication and are not enduring sources of Delaware's competi-
tive advantage. The incorporation decision, however, is not lim-
ited to tangible use-related criteria or performance characteris-
tics. Equipped with imperfect information, companies must also
consider intangible criteria that signal jurisdictional value.
2. Intangible Criteria Signaling Value to Incorporating Firms
Corporate law, in general, is uniform among many states. The
principal difference lies in the "pace of innovation."'93 In addition
to having tangible internal features lowering business costs,
Delaware boasts more indirect or intangible criteria creating firm
value.'94 Intangible criteria (related to what the Delaware brand
represents) are essential elements of the Delaware brand, which
may or may not require continued expenditures from the state of
Delaware. '95
a. Reputation
Companies often reincorporate in Delaware to expand the
overall scope of their operations either through an IPO or merger
and acquisition activity. 196 In either scenario, the firm will benefit
from tangible use-related sources of value. In addition, Delaware
incorporation sends a signal that a company has "big-time ambi-
tions" in the large issues market. 197 Some experts have observed
192. See Alva, supra note 113, at 919 (summarizing Delaware's efficiency advantage).
193. See Carney, supra note 12, at 717.
194. In the context of the Delaware Brand, these intangible criteria may also have a
positive psychological impact. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
195. This suggests that Delaware's market position is not necessarily a function of
anti-competitive behavior.
196. See Gordon, supra note 91, at 1963.
197. See id.
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how Delaware's reputation for corporate efficiency and friendli-
ness may positively impact stock price; however, these studies are
inconclusive. 19' Delaware's judiciary has a reputation that, in
some cases, can only be developed through the use of the court
system.199 The judiciary's decisions serve as public demonstra-
tions of judicial skill and allow the "courts to communicate their
skills continuously to the public." 00 Constant adjudication en-
hances Delaware's reputation. Even if other states recruited ex-
pert judges, it is unlikely this would lead to an instant boost in
reputation .201 Delaware's international reputation for under-
standing novel legal business issues contributes to the overall
perception of U.S. corporate governance.
b. Time-in-Business
Delaware has a time-in-business advantage, which translates
into a lasting reputation. Delaware is viewed as a pioneer and
perennial leader in the market for corporate law. This perception
is hard for other competitors to overcome. 2 2 Similar to Coca-Cola
in the cola market, IBM in the personal computer market, and
Daimler-Benz in the luxury car market, buyers assume time-in-
business reflects quality and experience.2 3 Such a response is ra-
tional because, when faced with the uncertainty of another rival
jurisdiction, a firm will gravitate toward comfort and familiarity
198. See Daines, Firm Value, supra note 46, at 525 (finding higher Tobin's Q measure-
ments for Delaware's corporations); Daines, Incorporation Choices, supra note 25, at 1560
(noting the impact of Delaware reincorporation on share price); Romano, Competition for
Corporate Charters, supra note 38, at 848 (noting several studies have found positive price
effects following Delaware incorporation); Subramanian, supra note 46, at 33 (finding sta-
tistical evidence that firms incorporated in Delaware were worth more than non-Delaware
firms between 1991-1996, but that this trend subsided after 1996); Allen, supra note 3, at
2 (asserting reincorporation normally results in an immediate increase in stock price). But
see Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrel, What Matters?, supra note 46 (finding six pro-entrenchment
aspects of corporate governance have a negative effect on shareholder value).
199. See Kamar, supra note 14, at 1925-26.
200. Id. at 1935. Former Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey notes that Delaware's repu-
tation "is driven primarily by the national respect for our Court of Chancery and Supreme
Court, as well as the historic and current initiatives of the General Assembly and the Gov-
ernor in providing modern statutes and outstanding service to Delaware corporations."
Veasey, Best Job, supra note 176, at 21; see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 39, at 1612 (de-
scribing perception of Delaware judge-made law as technical and apolitical).
201. See Kamar, supra note 14, at 1935 (discussing the lengthy process of attaining
"the judicial advantage").
202. See PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 93, at 186.
203. Coca-Cola is more than 120 years old and the majority of the world's most valu-
able brands have existed for more than fifty years. See CLIFTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 28.
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that stems from choosing a proven and identifiable product. Dela-
ware's time-in-business allows it to play a greater role in defining
corporate standards and shaping the competitive agenda.
c. Market Share and Customer Lists
The fact that most Fortune 500 companies are chartered in
Delaware is itself a signal of value and quality. The list of firms
incorporated in Delaware serves as a preferred customer list.
Given this preferred list of customers, firms will likely assume
Delaware is "better informed about the optimal formulation of the
law due to its prolonged preeminence."2 4 Some corporations may
follow others as an alternative to incurring the search costs in
finding a more advantageous jurisdiction. A similar rationale
goes into individual decision making processes whereby people
rely on information from others when making everyday business
decisions, such as enlisting the services of a doctor or a me-
chanic.205 Thus, the fact that so many successful large firms have
incorporated in Delaware cultivates further demand." 6 This may
result from a genuine belief concerning Delaware's tangible value
or a desire to be held in the same esteem as other Delaware cor-
porations.207
d. Academic Curriculum and Scholarly Debate
Widespread use of Delaware corporate law and its preeminence
as the most desirable corporate domicile "invariably" make Dela-
ware a central part of business law curriculum in the nation's law
schools.208 Virtually every textbook used to teach corporate law to
American law students recognizes Delaware's preeminence.2 9
204. Kamar, supra note 14, at 1938.
205. See id. States may copy Delaware statutory law because they believe Delaware
has invested more resources and expertise in developing their law.
206. See AAKER, supra note 11, at 19 (asserting existing customers can provide brand
exposure and reassurance).
207. Coffee, supra note 47, at 703 (describing a herding theory for analyzing Dela-
ware's preeminence). One can also marshal a similar herding argument to explain, in part,
why so many states emulate Delaware statutory law. See discussion supra Part III.B. 1.a.
208. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why Students Learn Delaware Corporate Law,
CORP. EDGE, (Div. of Corps., Dover, Del.) Fall 1997, http://web.archive.org/web/20040516
050604/www.state.de.us/corp/lawstudt.htm.
209. See, e.g., R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, at F-1 (3d ed. 1998); ROBERT CHARLES
CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 13.6, at 584-88 (1986); CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CORPORATE
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This phenomenon dates back prior to the 1950s.210 Undoubtedly,
lawyers play a role in the incorporation decision. As a result, law-
yers advising incorporating firms will often prefer law that is fa-
miliar. This usually creates two options-incorporating either in
their home state or in Delaware.
Scholarly debate also draws attention to Delaware's advan-
tages. But, even when the scholarly analysis is not laudatory, it
nonetheless draws attention to Delaware. In addition to adding to
Delaware's mystique, corporate law scholarship may act as an
additional check on Delaware legal actors. No other state comes
close to attracting the attention Delaware receives from corporate
legal scholars. Only the federal government (e.g., the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC")) attracts more attention than
Delaware as evidenced by the recent volume of SOX-related arti-
cles. Such emphasis ensures tomorrow's corporate lawyers will be
versed in Delaware law. Meanwhile, "[a] massing a similar body of
knowledge with respect to some other jurisdiction's corporate law
would require a radical reformation of the corporate law curricu-
lum and an expensive retooling of the nation's corporate bar.""
The unchallenged emphasis on Delaware law operates as free ad-
vertising and signals Delaware's jurisdictional superiority to law-
yers and corporations.
In addition, Delaware judges are prolific authors on corporate
governance matters 2 2 and often participate in conferences and
GOVERNANCE, at xiii-xiv (D.D. Prentice & P.R.J. Holland eds., 1993) (listing case citations
from various countries, including nineteen U.S. cases, seven of which are from Delaware);
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 68 (8th
ed. 2000); FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 1.2, at 42-43 (2000); THOMAS LEE
HAZEN & JERRY W. MARKHAM, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 2 (1st
ed. 2003); THOMAS R. HURST & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 124 (2d ed. 2005); ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDER-
STANDING CORPORATE LAW § 1.08, at 13 (1st ed. 1999); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & PETER V.
LETSOU, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS § 3.01, at 50 (3d ed. 1996); see also Cary, supra note 12,
at 671 ("Every corporation law casebook for students is filled with Delaware decisions be-
cause it is the state where great companies are organized and where there is the most cor-
porate experience to draw upon.").
210. See DELAWARE SUPREME COURT: GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY 1951-2001, supra note
169, at 82 (discussing Delaware's impressive body of corporate and fiduciary law taught as
leading authorities in U.S. law schools).
211. Hamermesh, supra note 208.
212. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 39, at 1603 n.117 (listing twenty-three publications
by Delaware judges); Hamermesh, Policy Foundations, supra note 45, at 1759 n.38 (listing
three more recent articles by Delaware judges).
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symposia around the world.213 In these fora, judges, practitioners,
and academics engage in discursive discussion where views and
insights are exchanged.214 Some scholars contend this process
creates an outlet for dissatisfaction thereby providing the judicial
version of comment procedures and lobbying.21 5
e. Visibility to Top Management
Delaware is highly visible to managers of large corporations. In
addition to asserting that managers (and perhaps the lawyers
advising them) control the incorporation decision, race theorists
explicitly and implicitly suggest Delaware's judicial and legisla-
tive pronouncements are directed to catch the eye of top man-
agement.2 16 Disputes in Delaware courts adorn the pages of major
newspapers and capture the attention of the national and global
business community.2"7 Brand experts contend news coverage
213. See Hamermesh, Policy Foundations, supra note 45, app. at 1788-92 (providing an
impressive list of engagements by various members of the Delaware Supreme Court and
the Court of Chancery).
214. See Strine, Exquisite Jewel, supra note 140, at 1270-71. Vice Chancellor Leo
Strine further acknowledges Delaware judges do not operate in a vacuum: "Our courts are
also responsive to 'constituent pressures,' which often take the form of learned commen-
tary on our corporation law." Id. at 1270.
215. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 39, at 1614. One could also characterize these gath-
erings as marketing activities by Delaware state actors.
216. Some race-to-the-bottom theorists contend such communication is often at the ex-
pense of shareholders. But, a more balanced, and perhaps more accurate view, would sug-
gest that irrespective of whether a response by Delaware courts is deemed pro-
management or pro-shareholder, firms will nonetheless acquiesce in a decision due to re-
spect for the courts.
217. See, e.g., Dennis K. Berman, The Game: Fine Line of Selling, Selling Out, The
Firm, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2007, at C1 (discussing Delaware judges' interest in establish-
ing a new line of cases in corporate governance related to CEO's soliciting buyout deals);
Bloomberg News, Suit Over Sale of Clayton Homes to Buffet, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2003, at
C8 (emphasizing Chancery Court's ability to force meetings between companies as part of
rulings); Rita K. Farrell, Lord Black Says Investors Should Decide on Asset Sale, N.Y.
TIMES, July 5, 2004, at C1 (associating the well-known Hollinger case with Delaware);
Laurie J. Flynn, Long Battle Between Oracle and Peoplesoft Shifts to a Delaware Court
Today, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2004, at C4 (discussing the Oracle case and linking Delaware
courts with important business topics including poison pills, good faith, manager respon-
sibility, and deference to business judgment); John Gapper, Capitalist Punishment, FIN.
TIMES (London), Jan. 29, 2005, Weekend Magazine, at 16 (detailing the history and evolu-
tion of the Court of Chancery and why it is generally considered pro-management, but how
recent decisions are changing that perception); Francesco Guerrera & Brooke Masters,
Rulings Mean Directors Face New Liability, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 16, 2007, Compa-
nies International, at 24 (discussing recent pro-shareholder decisions by Delaware courts);
Laura M. Holson, Ruling Upholds Disney's Payment in Firing of Ovitz, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
10, 2005, at Al (summarizing the issues in the Disney ruling and illustrating how Dela-
ware influences corporate governance); Steve Lohr, Suit Against Hewlett Deal is Dis-
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may be more effective publicity than paid advertising.2 8 The Van
Gorkom decision and the more recent Disney litigation illustrate
how Delaware court decisions draw considerable attention from
the business community.
i. Van Gorkom
The monumental 1985 decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom 219 fol-
lowed by the passage of 102(b)(7), signaled to corporate managers
that Delaware remained friendly and flexible to corporate
needs. 220 In Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court held that
the directors of Trans Union Corporation breached their duty to
missed, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2002, at C1 (linking business issues such as disclosure and
shareholder voting and a well-known company with Delaware courts); Dan Mitchell, A
Hollywood Moment in Delaware, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2005, at C5 (discussing a sympo-
sium devoted to Chancellor William Chandler's opinion in the Disney case); Floyd Norris,
Will 'Business Judgment' Rule Again in Delaware Courts?, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2001, at
C1 (discussing a paper that called for a return to the "business judgment" rule in Dela-
ware and highlighting the importance of Delaware courts); Bruce Orwall & Merissa Marr,
Judge Backs Disney Directors in Suit on Ovitz's Hiring, Firing, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2005,
at Al (linking Delaware courts to the Disney case); Andrew Parker & Sundeep Tucker, US
Judge Attacks Sarbanes-Oxley, FIN. TIMES (London), July 6, 2005, at 1 (highlighting com-
ments made by a Delaware judge concerning federal corporate governance reforms); Edito-
rial, Regulating Fantasyland, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2005, at A18 (discussing the Disney
case and linking the very public case with Delaware); Bob Sherwood, Delaware Court
Sends Wake-up Call, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 28, 2004, Companies, at 5 (discussing the
Hollinger case and displaying Delaware's importance in shareholder suits); Kaja White-
house, SEC is Allowed Access to Delaware High Court, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2007, at B3
(discussing Delaware constitutional amendment allowing SEC to bring questions directly
to the Delaware Supreme Court, highlighting the importance of Delaware courts to na-
tional corporate law).
218. See AAKER, supra note 11, at 74.
219. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). The directors were found personally liable for actions
deemed to be grossly negligent. Id. at 884.
220. In response to the Delaware Supreme Court's decision, the Council of the Corpo-
rate Law Section of the Delaware Bar appointed a committee to draft a statute limiting
director liability. See Alva, supra note 113, at 914-16. This bill overwhelmingly passed in
the General Assembly "without debate or amendment." Id. at 916. Another example of this
phenomenon would be Delaware's passage of a very moderate anti-takeover statute amid
the passage of stricter laws in other jurisdictions. William J. Carney describes the factors
compelling Delaware's moderate response:
These features of Delaware's response suggest that its legislature was in-
deed constrained by its concern over investor reactions to these statutes and
the effect they would have on the choice of chartering jurisdiction. The adop-
tion of any statute can be seen as a concession to incumbent managers seek-
ing protection and threatening to move to more protective jurisdictions. How-
ever, the relative moderation exercised by Delaware in enacting these laws
must surely be explained by the effects of a competitive market for charters.
Carney, supra note 12, at 755 (footnote omitted); see also Skeel, The Unanimity Norm, su-
pra note 138, at 139 (discussing Delaware's attempt to articulate an intermediate stan-
dard of review in the takeover context).
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make an informed decision about a proposed merger and as a re-
sult found the directors personally liable for damages. Van
Gorkom delivered a jolt to corporate boardrooms because "to hold
that distinguished business leaders breached their duty of care
and could be liable for millions of dollars in damages was not
something which had happened much before."221 In addition, Van
Gorkom may have caused director and officer insurance policies
to become more expensive.222
ii. Disney
A more recent example of Delaware's high visibility is the Dis-
ney litigation, which addressed executive compensation. 223 The
Disney decisions involved the controversial fourteen-month ten-
ure of Disney President Michael Ovitz and his $140 million dollar
severance package approved by Disney's board.224 Ultimately, the
Disney litigation did not result in liability for Disney's directors,
who approved Ovitz's compensation.225 Nonetheless, the decision
sent a warning signal to corporate boardrooms. 226 The Chancery
Court opinion noted that the conduct of the Disney directors "fell
significantly short of the best practices of ideal corporate govern-
ance" but was nonetheless in good faith. 227 The Chancery Court
decision used colorful language to describe the conduct of Disney
CEO Michael Eisner, asserting he "enthroned himself as the om-
nipotent and infallible monarch of his personal Magic King-
dom. 228 In essence, the court acknowledged the board was
"stacked" with friends and acquaintances of Eisner, who were
221. GEVURTZ, supra note 143, at 315-16. For the court's reasoning in finding a viola-
tion of the duty of care, see Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874-78, 884. See also Griffith, supra
note 47, at 12-14 (discussing the legacy of the Van Gorkom decision); Laurie P. Cohen,
Lipton Tells Clients that Delaware May Not Be a Place To Incorporate, WALL ST. J., Nov.
11, 1988, at B7 (discussing prominent corporate attorney's letter in response to controver-
sial Van Gorkom decision); Editorial, Corporate Liability Crisis, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21,
1986, at 22 (describing Van Gorkom); Letter to the Editor, Directors' Duty to Shareholders,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 1986, at 1 (replying to Van Gorkom editorial).
222. See Corporate Liability Crisis, supra note 221.
223. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d 693
(Del. Ch. 2005).
224. 746 A.2d at 251, 253; 907 A.2d at 697-98.
225. 746 A.2d at 266; 907 A.2d at 779.
226. See generally Holson, supra note 217; Orwall & Marr, supra note 217; Regulating
Fantasyland, supra note 217.
227. 907 A.2d at 697.
228. Id. at 763.
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"certainly more willing to accede to his wishes."22 9 The Disney liti-
gation illustrates that, even where a decision does not result in
liability for board members, embarrassing details of corporate
dysfunction may tarnish a company's reputation.230 Reputational
risk is another salient reason for boardrooms to pay attention to
Delaware court pronouncements.231
f. Credible Commitment
Credible commitment is the belief that the Delaware legal re-
gime and its various actors will continue to meet the ever-
changing needs of the business community in a non-politicized
manner. This feeling of security, or peace of mind, is independent
of Delaware's tangible features. There is an implicit understand-
ing between the Delaware brand and Delaware firms. Delaware's
investment in legal capital (i.e., judicial expertise, case law, a
specialized bar, and a business-like Division of Corporations) and
its reliance on franchise taxes instills confidence among firms
that Delaware will continue to respond to their demands. Dela-
ware's investment in legal capital signals to corporations that
Delaware will continue to provide experienced and skilled judges
and lawyers to assist corporations.232 Without the attraction of
corporate charters, Delaware's investments in legal capital would
lose their value. The political climate in Delaware (characterized
by a mild conservatism and distrust of large fluctuations) also
serves as an additional guarantee against uncertainty.233 Dela-
ware's credible commitment is a disadvantage for other states be-
cause simply offering better law without attention to intangible
criteria will not challenge Delaware's preeminence and competi-
tive advantage. Even if a rival state were to lower franchise taxes
to attract charters, this would perhaps make that jurisdiction's
229. Id. at 760.
230. See Orwall & Marr, supra note 217; Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How
Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997) ("Delaware
courts generate in the first instance the legal standards of conduct (which influence the
development of the social norms of directors, officers, and lawyers) largely through what
can best be thought of as 'corporate law sermons."').
231. See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1811 (2001) (describing shaming in the corporate context).
232. See Hamermesh, Policy Foundations, supra note 45, at 1752-62.
233. See id. at 1772-76.
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commitment seem less credible compared to that of Delaware. 234
Credible commitment extends beyond merely lowering costs. For
Delaware, it is about securing future demand. Credible commit-
ment from the firm perspective is a backward-looking concept
that reinforces the ex ante expectations and investment of firms.
Former Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey expresses the need to
signal an enduring commitment: "As business and court man-
agement become increasingly complex and other states seek
fiercely to compete with us, we have to realize that we need to
'earn our wings every day' to justify that national respect and the
respect and trust of our citizens."235 Thus, Delaware must find
ways to sustain its competitive advantage after the incorporation
decision. One way of achieving this is through signaling a credible
commitment that is not static, but dynamic.236 Credible commit-
ment provides security for Delaware firms and plays a key role in
strengthening the Delaware brand.
g. Competitors
Contrary to what most of the state competition literature sug-
gests, competing rival jurisdictions can enhance Delaware's com-
petitive advantage in several ways.2 37 First, the presence of rival
jurisdictions actually enhances Delaware's dominance because
competitors act as signals of value for Delaware's law-whether
good or bad. Delaware's position in front of the competition sig-
nals quality to corporate firms. The fact that competition has re-
sulted in statutory uniformity across numerous jurisdictions may
signal to corporate firms that Delaware law is superior. Imitators
are not held in the same regard as market leaders.238 Second, ri-
val jurisdictions can serve unattractive categories of buyers.239
Third, rival jurisdictions lower the threat of federal encroach-
ment. Finally, competitor presence, whether state or federal, in-
creases Delaware's motivation to improve.24 °
234. See Kamar, supra note 14, at 1927.
235. Veasey, Best Job, supra note 176, at 21.
236. See Veasey, Center of Universe, supra note 12, at 168 (listing a number of mod-
ernization projects Delaware courts have undertaken).
237. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 12, at 589-605.
238. For example, Hyundai is not held in the same regard as Honda.
239. Here, an example would be privately held or small- and medium-sized enterprises.
240. Delaware cannot ignore the presence of rival jurisdictions and the threat of federal
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The above-mentioned differentiation advantages-tangible and
intangible-contribute to Delaware's dominance. The enumerated
advantages above, although distinct, are elements of the Dela-
ware brand. These advantages reveal how Delaware provides a
unique customer experience and sustains its market power like a
branded product or service.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF BRANDING ON THE CORPORATE
REGULATORY COMPETITION DEBATE
Delaware has become the default choice for large publicly
traded firms seeking incorporation. The previous sections illus-
trate how Delaware's dominance is, in part, the result of the
Delaware brand-a conglomeration of tangible and intangible
elements. To the extent Delaware's legal regime is branded, the
Delaware brand has significant implications for the broader cor-
porate regulatory competition debate.
A. A Compelling Descriptive Account of Delaware's Dominance
The branding discussion provides a compelling account of
Delaware's dominance. An analysis of branding in the corporate
charter market illustrates how existing regulatory competition
theories provide an incomplete description of state charter compe-
tition because they omit one of the most important sources of
Delaware's competitive advantage. By recognizing the interaction
between tangible and intangible elements, the branding account
further illustrates how the explanatory power of traditional cor-
porate regulatory competition theories are overstated. "Messy" or
"soft" factors like branding effects show how the abundance or
dearth of competition alone cannot serve as a proxy for legal qual-
ity or justify further federalization of corporate law.241 In a sense,
the state charter competition debate has morphed into a referen-
dum on Delaware's legitimacy as a de facto regulator of U.S. cor-
porations.242 Few dispute the importance of legitimacy and even
government encroachment.
241. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J. 1519, 1542
(2004) [hereinafter Skeel, Corporate Anatomy] ("The law is simply a piece of a much larger
system, and only by looking at the entire system can lawmakers and scholars evaluate any
given issue or develop an informed proposal for change.").
242. An overarching concern in the regulatory competition debate is Delaware's legiti-
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fewer can define it in a concise manner. Because legitimacy is a
complex concept, its measurement is, at best, a speculative exer-
cise. Generally, there are two types of legitimacy: substantive and
procedural.243 From the substantive perspective, legitimacy re-
flects the belief that particular decisions of the Delaware courts
are substantively correct. Substantive legitimacy, however, may
vary from group to group, case to case, and methodology to meth-
odology. Accordingly, "[t]here is too much controversy among le-
gal elites, and too little informed endorsement among the mass
public, to warrant strong claims of legal [or substantive] legiti-
macy (as opposed to weak or disputable ones) for the interpretive
methodologies that substantially define the judicial role. 244
Procedural legitimacy hinges on the presence of institutional
arrangements that promote safeguards, (e.g., transparency and
independence) and prevent abuses of power.24 5 From this vantage
point, to challenge Delaware's legitimacy "is to question whether
it is entitled to obedience" irrespective of the actual outcomes of
judicial decisions. 246 The effective functioning of political institu-
tions requires the goodwill of the public. Unlike the legislative or
executive branches of government, Delaware courts lack a formal
connection to the electorate. This illustrates how Delaware and
its courts "must depend to an extraordinary extent on the confi-
dence, or at least the acquiescence, of the public." '247 Without this
acquiescence or confidence, the threat of federal preemption
would become more imminent.
macy as a de facto regulator of corporations given its small stature. See, e.g., Cary, supra
note 12, at 695 (questioning Delaware's legitimacy and influence).
243. See Cary Coglianese, Legitimacy and Corporate Governance, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L.
159, 161 (2007) (asserting corporate governance is akin to procedural legitimacy).
244. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787,
1827 (2005).
245. See Coglianese, supra note 243, at 161-62.
246. David A. Strauss, Legitimacy and Obedience, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1854, 1866 (2005).
Kahan and Rock contend the public perception of Delaware law as largely "technocratic"
and "apolitical" helps fend off federal intervention. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 39, at
1611-15.
247. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira, Neither the Purse Nor the Sword: Dynamics of Pub-
lic Confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1209, 1209 (1986). Al-
though useful, public opinion is not an adequate proxy for legitimacy because it may over-
simplify the complex and nuanced concept of legitimacy. For example, the public may
disagree with a particular decision, but nonetheless acquiesce and obey the decision out of
respect for the institution. Another major criticism is that the public is not that familiar
with the Delaware courts and their interpretive practices. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 244
at 1825-26. Whereas public opinion may vary widely, Delaware's institutional legitimacy
is more fixed. See id. at 1827-29.
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In the complex corporate law context, the measure for Dela-
ware's legitimacy should, at a minimum, reflect its ability to bal-
ance competing values (e.g., law and equity, or authority and ac-
countability) and mirror the complexity of its subject matter.248
The Delaware branding account captures this complexity and, as
a consequence, "encompasses not only legal rules [and unitary
values such as economic efficiency], but also norms, history, and
social context." 249
B. The Delaware Judiciary's Incentives To Engage in Principled
Lawmaking
Traditional accounts of Delaware's dominance, especially race-
to-the-bottom theories, tend to discount the prospect of principled
lawmaking by Delaware's judiciary. Principled lawmaking occurs
when Delaware judges analyze the complex cases before them,
acknowledge legal precedent, and balance competing values, such
as efficiency, equity, authority, and accountability. Traditional
accounts of Delaware's dominance sometimes denigrate the judi-
cial role by asserting that Delaware's lawmaking, whether good
or bad, is simply a defensive measure in response to state-to-state
competition or a federal-state rivalry. Delaware's judiciary (i.e.,
Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court),
however, is not as defensive, calculating, rent-seeking, or oppor-
tunistic as some accounts of regulatory competition indicate.25 °
Even if one wholeheartedly accepts these accounts of Delaware
lawmaking, one must acknowledge how brand maintenance con-
tributes to the shape of Delaware law. In Delaware's case, brand
248. See Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50 WASH. AND
LEE L. REV. 1565, 1587 (1993) (arguing corporate law must acknowledge technical and
normative complexity to retain its legitimacy); see also DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE
BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME
FROM 6-10 (2005) (highlighting three enduring issues that stifle regulators: risk taking,
competition, and complexity of organizations).
249. Skeel, Corporate Anatomy, supra note 241, at 1522.
250. See Hamermesh, Policy Foundations, supra note 45, at 1772-86. Delaware critics
often focus on narrow aspects of Delaware law, such as ownership decisions involving
takeovers, to make normative judgments concerning the entire Delaware legal regime and
its legitimacy. This narrow approach is flawed because it fails to incorporate the range of
corporate decisions covered by Delaware law. See Veasey, Defining Tension, supra note 48,
at 394 (dividing corporate governance issues three separate areas: enterprise, ownership,
and oversight issues). Ownership issues tend to be the most controversial. See id. Take-
over defenses fall under this category of decision.
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maintenance necessitates principled lawmaking. 21 The Delaware
brand is often associated with judicial integrity, competence, the
understanding of corporate complexity, flexibility, and apolitical
decision making. If Delaware's judiciary is perceived as unbal-
anced (e.g., biased, ad hoc, arbitrary), offending managers, inves-
tors, and other key interest groups, such groups may lobby Con-
gress to act.252 Stated differently, there are key incentives for
Delaware's judiciary to engage in principled lawmaking: namely,
averting extensive federal encroachment.25 3 The strength of the
Delaware brand can and has survived moderate federal incur-
sions, but extensive federal encroachment poses a more serious
threat.254 In sum, maintaining the strength of the Delaware
brand is contingent on the perception that the Delaware judiciary
engages in principled lawmaking. This perception dissuades fed-
eral preemption.
C. The Sustainability of Delaware's Brand
The Delaware branding account demonstrates that Delaware's
dominance is sustainable and relatively unchallenged by other
states. Given the strength of the Delaware brand, the federal
government is Delaware's only formidable threat.255 To maintain
its dominance, Delaware must attract new entrants to offset
losses from combinations, business failures, and relocations.256
The vexing question is how Delaware can achieve this. Delaware
has sustained its market position as a result of the following: (i)
developing sources of differentiation that are hard to duplicate;
(ii) utilizing multiple sources of differentiation incorporating and
251. See Veasey, Aspirations, supra note 51, at 2179 ("A word of caution is that the
judge-made law must not be of a free-wheeling or ad hoc quality. It must involve a disci-
plined and stable stare decisis analysis based on precedent and a coherent economic ra-
tionale."); see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 39, at 1598 (describing Delaware's judge-
made law as flexible and fact-intensive while still being based on long-standing fiduciary
principles).
252. See Roe, Delaware's Politics, supra note 39, at 2518-19.
253. See Gordon, supra note 91, at 1967-70 (expressing skepticism that the motiva-
tions of Delaware courts, specifically the Delaware Supreme Court, are accurately por-
trayed by public choice accounts of charter competition).
254. See Roe, Delaware's Politics, supra note 39, at 2498.
255. See generally, Roe, Delaware's Competition, supra note 39, at 600-02; Kamar,
Myth, supra note 39, at 684.
256. See Gordon, supra note 91, at 1962. A survey revealed that approximately 80% of
corporations leaving Delaware reincorporate in their principal state of business. Kaouris,
supra note 114, at 1000.
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reincorporating firms' value; (iii) retaining corporations already
heavily invested in Delaware's uniqueness, thus making switch-
ing costs too high; and (iv) branding effects, which lower search
costs, insulate firms from episodes of turbulence or service fail-
ure, and secure future demand. Sustainable competitive advan-
tage and the viability of the Delaware brand require Delaware to
continue to develop both tangible and intangible sources of differ-
entiation to attract corporations. Delaware's level of differentia-
tion reflects the cumulative value it creates for incorporating
firms.
A key component of Delaware's differentiation is the overall
strength of its brand.2" 7 Therefore, the Delaware brand cannot
become a commodity. Once established, top brands become ex-
tremely durable.25 ' Leading brand studies illustrate top brands
are slow to decay,2"9 and Delaware is no different. For example,
Coca-Cola is more than 120 years old and the majority of the
world's most valuable brands have existed for more than fifty
years.2 60 Although the estimated life span of a corporation is ap-
proximately twenty-five years,261 strong brands can outlive a
string of corporate owners. Strong brands also insulate firms
against the impact of product failure or turbulence.262 For exam-
ple, in the 1980s, a nationwide tampering scandal called into
question the safety of the Tylenol brand.263 Johnson & Johnson,
the owner of the Tylenol brand, weathered the storm of contro-
versy by removing its product from retail shelves and providing
tamper-proof packaging.264 Here, the strength of the Tylenol
brand insulated its manufacturer from long-term reputational
damage and prevented the loss of long-term customer goodwill.
One can analogize the Tylenol scenario to the Van Gorkom back-
257. CLIFTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 43 (asserting brands are tremendous assets that
provide long-term competitive advantage).
258. See AAKER, supra note 11, at 70-71, 84.
259. See id.
260. CLIFTON ET AL., supra note 5, at 28.
261. See id. (citing RICHARD N. FOSTER & SARAH KAPLAN, CREATIVE DESTRUCTION:
WHY COMPANIES THAT ARE BUILT TO LAST UNDERPERFORM THE MARKET-AND HOW TO
SUCCESSFULLY TRANSFORM THEM (2001)).
262. See KELLER, supra note 11, at 53-56 (discussing the impact of brands in periods of
crisis).
263. See David Kaplan, Franchises Can Windup in Sticky Situation, HOUS. CHRON.,
May 25, 2003, Business Section, at 1.
264. See id. at 57-60 (discussing Johnson & Johnson's response to the Tylenol tamper-
ing scandal).
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lash and the subsequent passage of the 102(b)(7) exculpation
statute.265 The Van Gorkom decision was largely an unpopular
decision in its time and is by today's standards as well.266 Ulti-
mately, the decision and its aftermath neither caused massive
corporate migration nor undermined Delaware's long term domi-
nance. Similarly, the strength of the Delaware brand explains, in
part, why Delaware can withstand criticism during periods of
corporate scandal, such as the Enron aftermath, only to return to
its ex ante position. 267 For Delaware, "[t]he good news is that well-
established brands can take a lot of punishment before they are
irretrievably damaged." 268 In sum, Delaware's historical domi-
nance portends that the Delaware brand is here to stay.269
1. The Threat of Rival Jurisdictions
The strength of the Delaware brand creates few options for ri-
val jurisdictions.270 Some commentators argue that rival states
face insurmountable barriers to competition because it is too dif-
ficult "for any other jurisdiction to replicate all the advantages
Delaware now possesses."271 Recognizing this, one might expect
states not to have many incentives to compete and to become in-
different to innovation.272 Simple replication will not yield the
same benefits for rival jurisdictions because the incorporation de-
cision is a multi-faceted package. Even when faced with Dela-
265. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.e.i.
266. See Fred S. McChesney, A Bird in the Hand and Liability in the Bush: Why Van
Gorkom Still Rankles, Probably, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 631, 631 (2002) ("Considered a legal
disaster in 1985, it is judged no less disastrous today.") (footnote omitted).
267. Cf Griffith, supra note 47, at 8.
268. Gapper, supra note 4.
269. See generally Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109
HARv. L. REV. 641 (1996) (asserting that conditions existing at the time an institution is
formed will influence its functioning far into the future, without respect to efficiency con-
siderations).
270. Despite its limits, competition plays an undeniable role in the creation of corpo-
rate law. See Carney, supra note 12, at 726. Competition provides incentives for Delaware
to innovate its law, and almost equally (if not more) important, it lowers the threat of fur-
ther federal encroachment into Delaware's regulatory sphere-something Delaware and
its firms can be happy about. Moreover, rival jurisdictions signal the value of Delaware's
package and serve unattractive categories of corporations. Thus, Delaware is not adverse
to competition. This does not mean, however, that Delaware does not have an incentive to
engage in defensive tactics to sustain competitive advantage.
271. Id. at 718 n.8.
272. Other states have fewer incentives to attract corporate charters because franchise
taxes do not constitute a significant portion of state revenues as compared to Delaware. Id.
at 718-19.
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ware's dominance, however, there are perhaps still alternatives
and potential opportunities. Delaware's failure to live up to the
Delaware brand's core associations, such as judicial integrity and
flexibility, may create potential opportunities for rival jurisdic-
tions. By ignoring the intangible aspects of its brand, Delaware
could become vulnerable to attack from a rival jurisdiction. Dela-
ware's strong brand equity, however, makes this an unlikely sce-
nario. The greatest risk to the Delaware brand remains the pros-
pect of federal preemption.
The most formidable alternative for rival jurisdictions in the
charter competition context is to focus or specialize in serving a
particular category of corporation that is not served or is under-
served by Delaware's legal regime. A focus strategy entails identi-
fying differences in corporate need among different categories of
companies and marketing to a distinct niche. There are perhaps
three potential categories of corporations that rival states can ca-
ter to in the charter market. First, a state may serve private
closely held companies that are not served (or are underserved)
by Delaware's legal regime.273 The corporate law literature as
well as Delaware's taxation scheme suggest Delaware does not
target this segment of the market.274 A second category of corpo-
rations rival jurisdictions can attract are publicly held companies
whose principal business operations are located within the par-
ticular rival jurisdiction.275 A survey finding approximately eighty
percent of the corporations leaving Delaware reincorporate in
273. See Carney, supra note 12, at 716 (considering the question of whether states ac-
cept "a secondary role as incorporators of truly local, nonpublic businesses"); see also Barry
D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, 28
J.L. & ECON. 179 (1985). An example of privately held companies that rival jurisdictions
could target by providing incentives would be internet companies, many of which are pri-
vately held. Before interstate banking regulation eliminated its uniqueness, states at-
tempted to attract banks through a favorable regulatory climate and taxes. In fact, Dela-
ware was one of the first states to adopt such banking legislation in 1981. Although many
large banks are not private, this example is helpful nonetheless.
274. Delaware's franchise tax fee schedule lays a greater burden on large publicly
traded corporations. Franchise taxes are determined using two methods. See Delaware
Department of State, Division of Corporations, Franchise Tax Calculations, www.corp.
delaware.gov/frtaxcalc.shtml (last visited Mar. 29, 2008). The authorized shares method
relies almost exclusively on the number of authorized shares. The second method used is
the assumed par value capital method, which utilizes a formula incorporating gross assets
and all issued shares. See id. These methods, coupled with Delaware's reliance on fran-
chise taxes for state revenues, suggest that Delaware is targeting large publicly traded
companies. Hence, privately held corporations may be unattractive to Delaware.
275. For a discussion of home-state bias, see discussion supra Part I.
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their principle state of business supports this proposition.276 Leg-
islatures in jurisdictions where companies have their principal
business activities will be more receptive to treating such corpo-
rations favorably because an exodus would result in not only a
significant loss of franchise tax revenue, but also a drop in overall
employment and investment. Finally, states may attract small
and medium-sized enterprises ("SMEs"); however, SMEs are not
a high-end market segment and, as a result, states may not wish
to target them.
Ultimately, the success of any focus strategy depends on
whether the segment of targeted corporations is large enough to
support the cost of a jurisdiction's tailored activities.277 Even if a
jurisdiction can serve a particular category of corporation, the
cost of doing so may be too high. Assuming it is cost effective for a
jurisdiction to focus and specialize, the sustainability of that
strategy will depend on three factors: (i) just how different the ju-
risdiction's focus is from Delaware and other states; (ii) the pres-
ence of barriers to imitating the focus strategy and the risk of be-
ing out-focused by a jurisdiction with an even narrower focus; and
(iii) the risk that corporations will be drawn to other jurisdictions
due to a shift in demand brought on by multiple factors, such as
changes in the legal environment, competitive behavior, or brand-
ing effects.278
2. The Federal Threat
As mentioned above, state-to-state competition is not a signifi-
cant threat to Delaware's dominance, but the threat of further
federal encroachment is real. The prospect of federal preemption
is more likely than corporate migration to other states. The fed-
eralization or preemption of state corporate law would generally
operate in two ways: (i) creating a federal chartering option or (ii)
preempting Delaware via federal lawmaking, as is currently
done. Merely offering a federal incorporation option would not
displace Delaware's dominance. Due to the strength of the Dela-
ware brand among key constituencies of managers and share-
holders, companies would continue to choose Delaware over the
276. See Kaouris, supra note 114, at 1000.
277. See PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 93, at 265-69.
278. See id.
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federal option. 279 However, the latter scenario involving federal
preemption via federal lawmaking, depending upon its extent,
could displace Delaware's dominance and weaken the Delaware
brand, especially to new incorporating firms. Mark Roe describes
the potential impact of extensive federal encroachment on Dela-
ware's dominance via lawmaking:
The state's reputation for good lawmaking would also be hurt if fed-
eral authorities regularly displaced it; and if corporate America or
the public lost confidence in Delaware, the franchise tax would be
threatened. If Delaware authorities lost their esprit, their lawmak-
ing quality would suffer. If too much went federal, the bar and corpo-
rate America could conclude that Delaware had lost its relevance. In
turn, fewer firms would want to go to Delaware and Delaware's net-
work externalities would weaken, opening up competitive opportuni-
ties for other states. At the limit, if Washington made all corporate
law, but states still chartered firms, then Delaware couldn't charge
more because its charter wouldn't come with any local law. Dela-
ware's tax bonanza would shrivel. 280
Despite having Commerce Clause powers to preempt Delaware
corporate law, the federal government seems reluctant to exercise
these powers. 28 ' Delaware's brand equity among powerful con-
stituencies (e.g., managers and shareholders), in part, explains
the federal government's reluctance. Delaware's brand strength
helps explain the manager and shareholder reluctance, aversion,
or indifference toward greater federal intervention even where
federal law may appear to favor their discrete interests. The fed-
eral-state interaction story is not simply about Delaware law-
makers fearing preemption. The federal government (e.g., Con-
gress) also fears a backlash from the corporate manager-investor
alliance, which arguably yields the greatest power in Washing-
ton.28 2 Mark Roe's public choice account supports the argument
that managers and shareholders-Delaware's primary interest
279. Federalizing all corporate charters could also destroy the Delaware brand, remov-
ing any semblance of competition, and Delaware's revenues as well.
280. Roe, Delaware's Politics, supra note 39, at 2918.
281. See Alan R. Palmiter, The CTS Gambit: Stanching the Federalization of Corporate
Law, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 445 (1991) (describing the impact of CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of America on corporate law, and how the federal government is still reluctant to pre-empt
Delaware and other state law).
282. See Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58 VAND.
L. REv. 1495 (2005) (describing a case study of FedEx to illustrate how corporations buy
and use political power).
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groups-have an affinity for the Delaware brand.2"3 Thus, the
strength of the Delaware brand keeps the federal government at
bay. As a practical matter, total preemption is unlikely given the
strength of the Delaware brand and its affinity among powerful
corporate constituencies. Alternatively, the federal government
opts for a measured approach, as reflected in minor or moderate
incursions, such as SOX legislation. 8 4
D. The Contribution of the Delaware Brand to U.S. Corporate
Governance
Another serious implication of the Delaware brand is its con-
tribution to U.S. corporate governance. Is the Delaware brand
good or bad for U.S. corporate governance? The answer to this
question depends on multiple factors, including one's vantage
point (e.g., managers, shareholders, or other stakeholders). One
might answer this question in the negative, arguing that Dela-
ware's brand is nothing more than a form of market irrationality,
which allows Delaware to perpetuate its market power while of-
fering a suboptimal product. Indeed, most brands have the poten-
tial to exploit customers-especially where intangible value sig-
nificantly outweighs tangible performance features. This is not
the case, however, with Delaware. Delaware's brand is not simply
an illusory marketing ploy; it has valuable content to counterbal-
ance some of its intangible features.8 5 Moreover, the threat of
federal intervention and preemption operates as an additional
283. Mark Roe asserts that managers and shareholders are the primary interest
groups influencing Delaware corporate lawmaking. Meanwhile, federal government law-
making is more pluralistic, involving more interest groups that reflect populist concerns
absent in Delaware. See Roe, Delaware's Politics, supra note 39, at 2518-19. Roe contends
Delaware is largely insulated from populist concerns, except to the extent the federal gov-
ernment makes Delaware lawmakers aware. Id. These periods of heightened awareness
coincide with corporate scandals. Delaware law, however, is malleable enough or provides
ample discretion for management to accommodate populist concerns. See Elhauge, supra
note 144, at 742. Even if populist groups are not included in the Delaware corporate law-
making process, their interests are nonetheless reflected in other types of regulation (e.g.,
environmental, labor, health and safety). See CLARK, supra note 143, at § 1.4 (distinguish-
ing between traditional corporate law and other laws affecting corporations). Even if tradi-
tionalists contend that such regulations do not fall under the rubric of corporate law, they
nonetheless have significant impacts on companies and populist stakeholder groups.
284. An example of a massive encroachment would be a federal statute codifying the
fiduciary duties of all U.S. directors.
285. See infra Appendix Figure 1. The ratio of Delaware's tangible factors to its intan-
gible ones may provide an indication of the Delaware brand's value to firms.
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check and balance on Delaware's potential abuse of its market
power.
The Delaware brand not only benefits individual firms, but also
strengthens U.S. corporate governance. Delaware, the SEC, and
self-regulating organizations, such as the New York Stock Ex-
change and NASDAQ, share regulatory oversight over most pub-
licly traded firms.2"6 Traditionally, Delaware law has governed
corporate internal affairs, while the SEC has addressed external
issues of securities trading and disclosure. There is considerable
debate, however, concerning the appropriate balance.2 7 While
some critics would describe the current relationship between
Delaware and the SEC as a "good cop, bad cop" routine with pub-
licly traded firms, the more accurate characterization is a com-
plementary relationship where both regulators provide security
for investors. 28 Delaware's style of corporate governance provides
flexibility and eschews a one-size-fits-all approach; yet, it is capa-
ble of responding to corporate fraud.8 9 Accordingly, "Delaware is
more likely to be part of the solution than . . . part of the prob-
lem."29 0
Furthermore, damage to the Delaware brand could undermine
firm value to the extent that equity markets discount for weak or
unpredictable governance structures. 291  Therefore, if the per-
ceived strength of governance structures is reflected in higher
286. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 39, at 1605-06; see also Veasey, Pompian & Di
Guglielmo, supra note 134, at 77 (describing how Sarbanes-Oxley blurs the traditional
lines between Delaware and the SEC).
287. See id.
288. Delaware and the SEC share a complementary role in the promulgation of corpo-
rate law. The work of the SEC and Delaware legal actors may overlap or inform the other.
See Whitehouse, supra note 217; see also Renee M. Jones, Does Federalism Matter? Its
Perplexing Role in the Corporate Governance Debate, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 879, 879
(2006) (noting the incoherent efforts to articulate appropriate boundaries between federal
and state corporate law regimes); Kahan & Rock, supra note 39, at 1621-22; Press Re-
lease, Delaware Supreme Court, Delaware Constitutional Amendment Enacted Allowing
the Securities and Exchange Commission to Bring Questions of Law Directly to the Dela-
ware Supreme Court (May 15, 2007) (on file with author), available at http://courts.dela
ware.gov/Courts/Supreme%20Court/pdf/?deconstamendO5l5O7pdf.pdf (explaining a Dela-
ware constitutional amendment allowing the SEC to seek the Delaware Supreme Court's
advice on corporate issues requiring a definitive answer interpreting Delaware state law).
289. See Larry E. Ribstein, Markets vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 58-60 (2003) (discussing the
advantages of Delaware law and state regulatory competition).
290. Id. at 59.
291. See Cary, supra note 12, at 668-70.
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stock prices, the Delaware brand has a positive impact on inves-
tors. There is empirical evidence, though inconclusive, showing
the positive impact of Delaware incorporation on share price.292
Such a spike in share price seems logical when one considers that
incorporations usually coincide with IPOs or ownerships changes,
which are corporate events signaling growth. But, more empirical
data is needed to confirm this Delaware effect, or spike, in share
price. Additionally, the legal uniformity created by Delaware's
dominance also facilitates securities pricing by making firm com-
parisons easier.293 To the extent empirical data confirms the posi-
tive impact of Delaware incorporation on security pricing, this
provides significant evidence of the Delaware brand's positive im-
pact on U.S. corporate governance.294 Yet, scholars may still ar-
gue Delaware is oblivious to populist stakeholder concerns and,
therefore, shareholder wealth alone cannot serve as an adequate
basis to evaluate the impact of the Delaware brand on U.S. corpo-
rate governance.295 This concern is valid, but overstated when one
considers the following mitigating factors. First, the broad discre-
tion provided under Delaware law allows managers to consider
populist concerns without being second guessed by courts.296 Sec-
ond, federal corporate law may incorporate broader stakeholder
292. See Daines, Firm Value, supra note 46, at 525 (finding higher Tobin's Q measure-
ments for Delaware's corporations); Daines, Incorporation Choices, supra note 25, at 1560
(noting the positive impact of Delaware incorporation on share price); Romano, Compeit-
tion for Corporate Charters, supra note 38, at 848-49 (noting that several studies have
found positive price effects following Delaware incorporation); Subramanian, supra note
46, at 32 (finding statistical evidence that firms incorporated in Delaware between 1991-
1996 were worth more than non-Delaware firms during the same period, though this trend
subsided after 1996); Allen, supra note 3, at 2 (asserting reincorporation normally results
in an immediate increase in stock price); see also Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, What Mat-
ters?, supra note 46.
293. See Kamar, supra note 14, at 1924.
294. Even in the absence of a public market for their shares, privately held firms ex-
hibit a preference for Delaware incorporation. See generally J.C. Dammann & Matthias
Schundeln, The Incorporation Choices of Privately Held Corporations (Univ. of Tex. Law,
Law & Econ. Research, Paper No. 119, 2007), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=
1049581.
295. See generally Fisch, supra note 282 (acknowledging certain stakeholder interests
are not reflected in measures of shareholder wealth and questioning the suitability of
shareholder wealth as a unitary basis for corporate regulatory decisions).
296. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn Stout, A Team Production Theory of Cor-
porate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (acknowledging directors, within their jurisdiction,
may consider non-shareholder interests in order to maximize the joint welfare of all firm
stakeholders).
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concerns. 297 Finally, the panoply of other regulations impacting
corporations (e.g., OSHA, ERISA, Clean Air Act, etc.) may ad-
dress stakeholder concerns.298 Any evaluation of the Delaware
brand must consider Delaware's interaction with other
regulators and bodies of law.
CONCLUSION
Existing accounts of state charter competition have overlooked
a key chapter in the story of Delaware's unchallenged domi-
nance-the Delaware brand. The Delaware brand is a conglom-
eration of tangible and intangible elements that has significant
implications for Delaware, incorporating firms, and U.S. corpo-
rate governance. Regulators, academics, and practitioners,
whether Delaware proponents or detractors, cannot ignore the
branding effects influencing incorporation decisions. Accordingly,
those involved in corporate reform efforts, such as further feder-
alization of U.S. corporate law, should carefully consider the po-
tential impacts of a weak Delaware brand.299
297. See Roe, Delaware's Politics, supra note 39, at 2502-04.
298. See CLARK, supra note 143, at § 1.4 (distinguishing between traditional corporate
law and other laws affecting corporations).
299. Although beyond the scope of this article, the branding story may have broader
implications. The branding account may have relevance to the discussion of corporate legal
convergence and global competition for corporate law (e.g., listing rules, etc.). See Gilson,
supra note 3, at 330. Countries desiring to attract foreign investment may adopt U.S.-type
corporate governance features because of their branding effects and not solely upon tangi-
ble performance characteristics. See Coffee, supra note 47, at 700. In today's competitive
business environment, multinational firms have choices and may decide to bypass U.S.
incorporation or listing on a U.S.-based exchange. Given the increased competition posed
by foreign jurisdictions, branding is especially important to the United States's jurisdic-
tional preeminence.
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